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PROPERTY AND CONTRACT ON THE INTERNET
WILLIAM

W. FISHER III*

The premise of this essay is a prediction: the creators of
intellectual products suitable for distribution on the Internet will soon
come to rely less and less on intellectual property law to enable them
to charge consumers who wish access to their products, and more and
more on a combination of contractual rights and technological
protections. The principal argument of this essay is that courts and
legislatures should not only facilitate and reinforce that shift, but
should also require that creators (and consumers) when setting up
such "private" arrangements abide by restrictions designed to protect
the public interest.
Part I of the essay contends that sensible legal regulation of the
Internet requires simultaneous solution of two questions: (a) What
should the default rules governing the relative rights of creators and
users be? (b) In what ways (if any) should creators and users be
permitted to use contracts or technology to rearrange the pattern of
entitlements created by these default rules? Part II proposes a set of
criteria that could be used to choose among various possible
combinations of responses to those two questions. Parts III-VI rely
on those criteria to propose, for regulating the uses of intellectual
products on the Internet, a composite regime centered on the
following propositions: Creators should be accorded only a modest
set of entitlements by the default rules. Creators and users should be
permitted (indeed encouraged) to modify those entitlements to their
mutual advantage.
The parties' contractual freedom should,
however, be curtailed by a set of compulsory terms.
Many of the topics addressed in this essay have been well chewed
by other writers. I will touch on those topics only lightly, merely
suggesting how they figure in the overall analysis, concentrating my
attention on the portions of my argument that are more-or-less
original.
* Professor of Law, Harvard University. I am grateful for the comments and suggestions
of Ian Ayers, Ed Baker, Yochai Benkler, James Boyle, Julie Cohen, Matthew Funk, Wendy
Gordon, Peter Jaszi, Mark Lemley, Jessica Litman, Margaret Jane Radin, and Diane Rosenfeld.

CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1203

I. THE FRAMEWORK
Suppose Frank writes a decent novel using a standard wordprocessing program on his "laptop" computer. He has not yet printed
it out; it exists only as a set of "l"s and "O"s on his hard drive. Grace
would like access to the novel-to read it and to use it in various
other ways for fun and profit. How might the law regulate the
relative rights of Frank and Grace vis-A-vis the novel? (Postpone, for
the moment, the question of what institutions make and apply this
"law.")
One imaginable legal regime would permit Grace to use any and
all means to obtain the novel and to do whatever she wished with it
once she had it. She could tear the computer out of Frank's hands,
copy the data file containing the novel onto a "floppy" disk, make
myriad duplicates of the disk, sell them to bookstores, translate the
text into Spanish, etc. Frank, in turn, would be permitted to use any
and all means to frustrate Grace's stratagems. Using the vocabulary
invented by Wesley Hohfeld, both Frank and Grace could be said to
enjoy, in such a regime, a large set of "privileges" (governmental
permissions to engage in specified activities) and an equally large set
of correlative "no rights" (inabilities to invoke the aid of the state to
control the behavior of the other party).1
In a second, slightly altered regime, Grace would be permitted to
do all of the things allowed above except seize the computer by force.
If a digital copy of the novel came into her hands lawfully, she could
do whatever she pleased with it. But she could not obtain it by
In
forcibly depriving Frank of possession of his computer.
Hohfeldian terms, Frank would enjoy in this altered regime a "right"
to invoke the aid of the state to prevent Grace from grabbing the
computer, and she would assume a correlative "duty" not to grab it.2
Other possible ways in which the law might alter (to Frank's
advantage) their relative entitlements include:
"
Grace may not obtain a copy of the novel by fraud-e.g., by
telling Frank falsely that she is an agent of his publisher.
*
Grace may not obtain the data through improper meanse.g., by "hacking" into Frank's computer when he connects
it to a network-if he has used reasonable precautions to
1. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning,23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913).
2. See id. at 30-32.
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shield the data.
* Grace may not copy the novel-even if she has obtained a
digital version of it lawfully.
* Grace may not resell a lawfully obtained copy of the novel.
•
Grace may not rent a lawfully obtained copy of the novel to
a third party.
* Grace may not include excerpts from the novel in an essay
criticizing it.
* Grace may not mock or parody the novel.
* After reading Frank's novel, Grace may not write a novel of
her own whose plot is strikingly similar.
* Grace may not independently write a novel of her own
whose plot is strikingly similar.
* Grace may not use in a novel of her own a well-defined
character who figures in Frank's.
* Grace may not make a movie based on Frank's novel.
* Grace may not read Frank's novel out loud to her children.
* Grace may not discuss the novel with anyone.
* Grace may not do anything at all with or to the novel
without Frank's permission.
Many more specific entitlements could, of course, be added to this
list, but these are sufficient to suggest the range of issues that the legal
system must (and does) address.
The rules that, in the United States, currently control these
various issues are complex, partly because they are derived from
many different sources and jurisdictions. Some are governed by state
common-law rules-the laws of torts, property, and crimes. Others
are governed by state statutes-for example, trade-secret statutes.
Others are governed by federal statutes-specifically, copyright and
telecommunications laws. Still others are controlled by the First
Amendment to the federal Constitution. The entitlements currently
generated by these layers of norms may be summarized as follows:
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Grace is forbidden to:3
Seize Frank's computer by force
Obtain the novel by fraud
"Hack" into Frank's computer to
get the novel
Copy the novel
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Grace is permitted to: 4

Resell a copy of the novel
Rent a copy of the novel to
someone else
Quote from the novel in a critical
review
Mock or parody the novel
Aware of the novel, write a very
similar story
Independently write a very
similar story
Use in her novel a well-defined
character from Frank's
Make a movie based on Frank's
novel
Recite the novel in private
Discuss the novel with others
A comprehensive map of their relative rights would, of course, be
even more elaborate.
What accounts for this patchwork pattern of entitlements? In a
very rough way, it can be traced to lawmakers' efforts to balance a
familiar set of competing objectives. On one hand, they have sought
to create incentives for the production of novels and other intellectual
products. On the other hand, they have sought to promote the
widespread dissemination of intellectual products and to create safe
harbors for a variety of educational or transformative uses of those
products. (A much more detailed instrumental analysis of this
general sort will be ventured in Part II.) But it would be a serious
3. In other words, Frank has a right to invoke the aid of the state to prevent Grace from
engaging in these activities, and she has a duty to refrain.
4. In other words, Grace enjoys privileges to engage in these activities, and Frank has a
no-right to ask the state to stop her.
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mistake to attribute too much rationality to the pattern. As the chart
makes clear, a wide variety of lawmakers (judges and legislators at
both the state and the federal levels) have contributed to its
construction-each of whom typically has had in view only a piece of
the overall system. Substantiating the claim that many features of this
doctrinal regime are senseless and could easily be improved would
take us far afield.5 Suffice it to say for now that the system is far from
perfect, even when measured against the goals it is conventionally
thought to advance.
Another feature of the extant pattern of entitlements bears
emphasis. Frank's ability to control the ways in which Grace uses his
novel plainly is limited. In some senses, Frank "owns" the novel, but
Grace is permitted to do many things with or to it that Frank might
find objectionable. Some commentators have suggested that, in this
respect, intellectual property is different from real (in both senses)
property. 6 But in fact the allocation of entitlements to the "owners"
and "nonowners" of land is similar to the allocation of entitlements to
the owners and nonowners of novels. For example, although a
landowner is commonly said to enjoy a "right to exclude" others from
his premises, he is forced, in many American jurisdictions, to tolerate
a wide variety of intruders: travelers on adjacent roads who find their
way blocked; lawyers and health-care workers who wish to supply
legal and medical services to migrant farm workers living on his land;
protesters who wish to distribute leaflets in his mall; airplanes flying
at a reasonable height through his airspace; etc.7
The other
entitlements customarily included in his bundle of sticks-the "right
to quiet enjoyment," the "right to lateral and subjacent support," and
the right to water-are all similarly qualified.8 In short, there exists,
at least in the United States, no such thing as an "absolute," "pure,"
or "unqualified" property right-either in ideas or in dirt.
Let's return now to the struggle between Frank and Grace.
5. A reader interested in pursuing this line might find helpful JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS,
SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
(1996); William W. Fisher III, The Growth of Intellectual Property:A History of the Ownership
of Ideas in the United States, in EIGENTUMSKULTUREN IM VERGLEICH (Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht 1999) also available in (visited June 4, 1999) <http://eon.law.harvard.edu/property/
history.html>; William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1659 (1988) [hereinafter Fisher, Fair Use Doctrine] and sources cited therein.
6. See, e.g., Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 217, 242-60 (1996).
7. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); State v. Shack, 58
N.J. 297 (1971); Campbell v. Race, 7 Cush. 408 (Mass. 1852).
& See, e.g., ROGER CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 414-35 (1993).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1203

Suppose that Frank's novel is "posted" on the Internet. (Ignore, for
the moment, the important question of how it gets there.) How, if at
all, should the entitlements in traditional settings be adjusted to take
into account this new medium? For example, when Grace uses her
web browser to read the novel on her computer screen, without
"downloading" the data file to a disk, should she be deemed to have
"copied" it in violation of section 106 of the Copyright Act? 9 What if
she does download a small portion of the novel-say, for inclusion in
a critical review? More specifically, if, using the Internet, Frank
makes it easy for Grace to pay him a small sum in return for the right
to copy that portion, but Grace still refuses to pay the fee, should
courts nevertheless excuse as a "fair use" Grace's nonpermissive
copying?
A great deal of time and energy has been devoted during the past
five years to questions of these sorts. Some scholars and government
officials argue that, to offset the increased danger of "piracy" on the
Internet, the rules should be "tightened"-i.e., more of the toggle
switches should be flipped in favor of Frank. 10 Others contend
equally vehemently that the rules should be "loosened"-i.e., more
switches should be flipped toward Grace.
In a moment, I will
venture some opinions on those issues. For the time being, however,
I wish merely to establish the framework for the analysis. For that
purpose, the central point is that the impact the initial setting of
switches will have upon the fortunes of Frank and Grace-and upon
the welfare of society at large-depends in important ways on the
extent to which Frank and Grace are permitted to reassign the
entitlements.
To illustrate, suppose for the sake of argument, that only the first
three of the topics listed in the chart on page-are resolved in favor
of Frank. Grace is forbidden to obtain the novel by force, fraud, or
"improper means" but is not otherwise hampered in her ability to
9. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
10. See, e.g., National Information Infrastructure Copyright Protection Act of 1995:
Hearings on H.R. 2441 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary,104th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-25 (1996) (testimony of Jack Valenti, Motion
Picture Association of America); National Information Infrastructure Copyright ProtectionAct
of 1995: Hearing on S. 1284 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-21
(1996) (testimony of Kenneth Kay, Creative Incentive Coalition).
11. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright
Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CoNN. L. REV. 981 (1996); Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright
Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19 (1996); John Perry Barlow, The Economy of
Ideas, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84, 85; James Boyle, Overregulating the Internet, WASH. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 1995, at A17; Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab,WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 134.
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make use of the novel. Frank will be unhappy, of course, but he will
not be wholly powerless. Those three entitlements will at least enable
him to limit users' access to his creation. He may be able to employ
that power to extract from Grace a variety of concessions not
assigned to him by the default rules. For example, he might agree to
provide Grace (through the Internet) access to a website, from which
she could download a copy of the novel, only if she consents to do
one or more of the following:
*
Pay him $10;
*
Pay him $.10 for every page she reads;
*
Pay him $.00003 times her gross income during the
preceding calendar year for every page she reads;
*
Not resell the downloaded copy of the novel;
*
Not use the downloaded copy to make a second (or third)
copy;
*
Not parody the novel;
*
Not criticize the novel publicly; or
*
Not buy or read a rival's novels.
As a practical matter, there are two ways in which Frank might
extract from Grace concessions of these sorts. First, the two parties
might enter into a contract. On the Internet, such a contract would
most likely be structured as a license agreement-of the sort that has
come to be known as a "click-on" or "click through" license. Frank
would organize his website so as to require Grace, before she is able
to download the data file containing the novel, to "click" on an icon
expressing her willingness to abide by a specified set of conditions12
and Grace would subsequently be bound thereby.
Second, Frank might employ one of a growing set of
technological devices to prevent Grace from using the novel in a
manner inconsistent with his conditions. Devices of this sort include:

12. Here, for example, is an excerpt from the "Terms and Conditions" associated with the
Martindale-Hubbell website:
You are hereby granted a nonexclusive, nontransferable, limited license to view,
reproduce, print, and distribute insignificant portions of materials retrieved from this
Site provided (a) it is used only for informational, non-commercial purposes, (b) you
do not remove or obscure the copyright notice or other notices. Except as expressly
provided above, no part of this Site, including but not limited to materials retrieved
therefrom and the underlying code, may be reproduced, republished, copied,
transmitted, or distributed in any form or by any means. In no event shall materials
from this Site be stored in any information storage and retrieval system without prior
written permission Martindale-Hubbell.
<http://www.martindale.com/site/terms.html>.
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"scramblers" that render copies made without permission unusable;
combinations of electronic components designed to discourage
"serial" copying; "cryptolopes" and "trusted systems" that prevent
anyone who does not have a digital "key" supplied by the producer
from gaining access to the products; devices that prevent a product
from being used more than a prescribed number of times or for more
than a prescribed period of time; and systems for measuring (and thus
13
charging for) the amounts that digital products are used.
Systems of these sorts plainly make it possible for Frank to
demand payment from Grace before permitting her to gain access to
the novel. In addition, they sharply reduce the risk that Grace will
create additional, duplicate copies of the novel without his
permission. However, at present, these technologies do not enable
creators to strike bargains with users as refined as the deals that can
be arranged using contracts. For example, Frank would not be ableusing extant forms of encryption-to prevent Grace from parodying
the novel while allowing her to make use of it in other ways. These
limitations on the flexibility of technological protections are likely to
diminish over time. For example, the techniques for tracking
intellectual products are improving swiftly. As a result, it will soon be
much easier for creators to monitor the ways in which their creations
are being employed-and thus to enforce contractual limitations on
permissible uses. And, encryption technology will likely enable
creators in the future to differentiate ever more precisely permissible
from impermissible activities.
Neither of these two ways of extracting concessions from users, it
should be emphasized, are the exclusive province of copyright
owners. (To that extent, the terms commonly used to describe some
of the encryption systems-such as "Copyright Management
Systems"-are misleading.) The producers of kinds of intellectual
products that are not eligible for copyright protection-such as
13. For descriptions of these various technologies, see Jon Bing, The Contribution of
Technology to the Identification of Rights, Especially in Sound and Audio-Visual Works: An
Overview, 4 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 234 (1996); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The
New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management", 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998) [hereinafter
Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace]; Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management
Systems and Laws Designed to Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161 (1997) [hereinafter
Cohen, Copyright Management Systems]; David M. Hornik, Combatting Software Piracy: The
Softlifting Problem, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 377 (1994); Philip E. Ross, Cops Versus Robbers in
Cyberspace, FORBES, Sept. 9, 1996, at 134; Cryptolope Containers (visited June 4, 1999) <http://
www.ibm.com/security/html/cryptolopes.html>; Koji Okumura, What Effect Does Copy
Protection Technology Have on Copyright Law? (LL.M. thesis, Harvard Law School, 1998) (on
file with author).
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databases that fail to satisfy the Feist standard of originality'4--have
even greater reason to avail themselves of these options. 15
To summarize, Frank might employ either a contract or a
technological device to parlay a meager bundle of rights into a much
more generous set of entitlements. The legal system might adopt any
of a wide range of postures toward such deals. We might set our faces
against them-for example, by forbidding the development or use of
a specified sort of encryption technology. Less drastically, we might
permit the use of a specified technology but discourage it-for
example, by imposing heavy taxes on its manufacture or sale.
Alternatively, we might not only permit the use of that technology
but encourage it-for example, by criminalizing the manufacture or
use of devices that enable others to circumvent it. Instead of
adopting a blanket rule toward all uses of the technology in question,
we might permit its use for some purposes but not for others.
A similar spectrum of options exists with respect to "click-on"
licenses. We might refuse to enforce any of them-for example, by
deciding that they are all "unconscionable" or that they are all
preempted by the Copyright Statute. Alternatively, we might enforce
all such license agreements. We might go even further and reinforce
the usual remedies for breach of contract (damages and specific
performance) with criminal sanctions-as we have done, for example,
with breaches of confidentiality by employees. 16 We might permit and
enforce some sorts of licenses but not others. Finally, taking our cue
from the Anglo-American law of servitudes, we might permit some
sorts of agreements (but not others) to "run with" the intellectual
property to which they pertain-i.e., to be enforceable not only
against the promisee, but also against third parties who acquire the
17
intellectual property from the promisee.
Which of these options makes most sense? It should by now be
apparent that the answer to that question depends upon the
magnitude of the set of entitlements assigned to creators by the
default rules. Our overall goal, recall, is to hold out to creators a set

14. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
15. See Cohen, Copyright Management Systems, supra note 13, at 176.
16. See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (Supp. 1997).
17. I am indebted for this analogy to Margaret Jane Radin. Cf Robert Merges, The End of
Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-line Commerce, 12
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115 (1997) also available in (visited June 4, 1999) <http://
www.law.berkeley.edu:80/journals/btlj/articles/issue.html>
(suggesting that we consider
dispensing with the privity limitation to the enforcement of contracts on the Internet).
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of incentives sufficient to induce them to produce intellectual
products from which we will all benefit, but not so great as to impede
public dissemination and use of those products. We might strive to
achieve that happy medium by according creators a generous set of
entitlements through default rules but then limiting their ability to use
those entitlements to extract from users still greater rights.
Alternatively, we might accord creators a minimal package of rights
through the default rules, but then give them wide latitude in
leveraging those rights into other concessions. Many intermediate
options are of course available.
In short, the question of the proper scope of intellectual property
rights on the Internet and the question of the proper magnitude of
contractual freedom on the Internet should be understood as
interdependent. Neither can be resolved sensibly without attention to
the other.
Before attempting actually to resolve them, however, we need to
be more precise concerning the objectives we are trying to achieve.
Up to this point, we have relied upon a conventional, rough-andready view that we need somehow both to encourage the creation of
intellectual products and to clear the channels for their dissemination.
If we wish to provide lawmakers real guidance, we need a more
detailed account of our ultimate ends. To that project we now turn.
II. ASPIRATIONS
To understand (and to evaluate) the normative theory upon
which this essay depends, it is helpful to have in view the larger set of
theories from which it is drawn. Section A outlines that set. Section
B elaborates my particular approach.
A. Theories of (Intellectual) Property
Political theorists and legal scholars have developed four main
ways of shaping and justifying property rights in general, and
intellectual property rights in particular. None of the four can
convincingly claim to provide policymakers a determinate method for
creating and allocating legal entitlements. Rather, each is best
understood and employed as a language-a paradigm helpful in
identifying considerations that ought to be taken into account when
determining who should own what.
The first approach springs from the proposition that a person
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who labors upon resources that are either unowned or "held in
common" has a natural property right to the fruits of his or her
labor-and the state has a duty to respect and enforce that natural
right. These ideas, originating in the writings of John Locke,"8 are
widely thought to be especially applicable to the field of intellectual
property, where the pertinent raw materials (facts and concepts) do
seem to be "held in common" and where (intellectual) labor seems to
contribute so importantly to the value of the finished product. 19
Agreement upon this basic proposition, however, has not produced
consensus on details.
Scholars who work this theoretical vein
continue to argue over such questions as: Does any sort of intellectual
labor give rise to natural property rights, or must the labor be socially
valuable, or unpleasant, or especially creative to support such a
claim?20 Does the creator of an intellectual product deserve to charge
whatever the market will bear for access to her creation, or are her
entitlements more limited? 21 Does the famous Lockean "sufficiency"
proviso (or the more general no-harm principle latent in other parts
of Locke's work) limit in any way the scope of the entitlements the
22
creator acquires?
The principle that powers the second of the four approaches is
that a policymaker's beacon when shaping property rights should be
the greatest good of the greatest number. In other words, he should
strive to select a set of entitlements that (a) induces people to behave
in ways that increase socially valuable goods and services and (b)
distributes those goods and services in the way that maximizes the net
pleasures people reap from them. A modified version of this
principle is the main article of faith of those lawyer/economists who

18. See, e.g. William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE
LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY (S.

Munzer ed., Cambridge Univ. Press

forthcoming 2000), also available in (visited June 4, 1999) <http://eon.law.harvard.edu/property/
history.html>.
19. But see Seanna Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments for Private Intellectual Property, in NEW
ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY, supra note 18 (contesting this

proposition).
20. See Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 609 (1993); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287
(1988).
21.

Cf. ROBERT NOZICK,

ANARCHY,

STATE AND

UTOPIA (1974)

(addressing the

analogous issue in patent law).
22. See, e.g., James W. Child, The Moral Foundationsof Intangible Property, 73 MONIST
578 (1990) (discussing the implications of these aspects of Locke's argument); Wendy Gordon,
A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993).
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continue to march under the banner of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. 23
The literature (both judicial and scholarly) on the law of intellectual
property is rife with invocations of this ideal. Its popularity, however,
has not produced consensus concerning its implications. Proponents
of the utilitarian approach to intellectual property continue to argue
over the proper shape of many doctrines-ranging from the kinds of
creations that should be rewarded with copyright protection to the
scope of the power patentees should enjoy to control improvements
on their inventions.
The heart of the third approach is that private property rights are
crucial to the satisfaction of some fundamental human needs or
interests; policymakers should thus strive to select the set of
entitlements that is most conducive to human flourishing. Much of
the interest-and controversy-associated with this approach
concerns the difficult job of identifying exactly which human needs or
interests are both implicated by property rights and deserving of
respect. The following are among the ideals emphasized by different
theorists who have adopted this strategy: autonomy; self-realization
as an individual; self-realization as a social being; security and leisure;
control over the presentation of one's self to the world; personal
responsibility; identity; peace of mind; privacy (and associated
opportunities for intimacy); citizenship (and the associated value of
civic virtue); and benevolence. 24 The task of determining which
system of intellectual property rights would best promote the
widespread realization of each of these ten ideals has only just
begun. 25
The fourth approach-upon which this essay is founded-is
rooted in the proposition that property rights can and should be
shaped so as to help foster the achievement of a just and attractive
culture. This perspective is less well known than the other three23. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11-15 (3d ed. 1986).
Not all economists writing about law would endorse the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, but it remains
the beacon for the majority.
24. For affirmations of various of these ideals, see, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND
WRONG (1978);

THOMAS HILL GREEN, LECTURES ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL

OBLIGATION (London, Longmans, Green & Co. 1941) (1879); Abraham Lincoln, Address at
the Wisconsin State Fair, in THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 134 (Richard
Current ed. 1967) (1859); MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY (1993);
JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988); Carol Rose, The Comedy of

the Commons, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION (1994).
25. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L.
REV. 1 (1997); Hughes, supra note 20; Lynn Sharp Paine, Trade Secrets and the Justificationof
Intellectual Property:A Comment on Hettinger,20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 247 (1991).
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each of which has both a familiar moniker (Labor-Desert Theory;
Utilitarianism; and Personality Theory) and a famous ancestor
(Locke; Bentham; Hegel). But once charted, the provenance of the
fourth approach is equally impressive; theorists who have approached
property rights in this spirit include Jefferson, the early Marx, the
Legal Realists, and the various proponents (ancient and modern) of
classical republicanism. 6 It lacks only a label to give it credibility.
For that purpose, Greg Alexander offers "proprietarian" theory; 27 my
own preference is for "social-planning theory."
To be sure, the boundaries between these four approaches are
far from precise. With a little effort, they can be shown to blur. For
example, as Alan Ryan has shown, much of Locke's labor-desert
argument depends upon recognition of the social advantages of
28
inducing people to labor-and thus incorporates a utilitarian theme.
Similarly, while the distinction between the personality and socialplanning theories is clear enough in the abstract (the former urges the
selection of property rights that help fulfill fundamental individual
needs, while the latter seeks to promote a just and attractive culture),
the examples of civic virtue and classical republicanism-as well as
many of the issues discussed in the following section-suggest that
they sometimes overlap in practice.
It is not my objective here to sharpen or defend those
boundaries. (My sense, in general, is that the four perspectives,
though not wholly autonomous, are useful as ideal types-but I will
not undertake now to defend that claim.) Rather, the purpose of the
foregoing quick sketch of the principal property theories has been to
identify-by contrasting it with its main rivals-the methodology that
undergirds this essay.
B. A Vision
The fourth approach, to repeat, counsels crafting legal rights in
general-and property rights in particular-so as to promote a just
and attractive culture. Well, then, what are the features of a just and
attractive culture? The difficulty of answering that question is, I
26. See, e.g., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993);
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (New York, Harper & Row 1964)
(1861); KARL MARX, ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844 (1964) (1932);
Morris R. Cohen, Property & Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927).
27. See GREGORY ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY (1997).
2& See ALAN RYAN, PROPERTY AND POLITICAL THEORY 28 (1984).
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think, the principal reason the method has not gained more
adherents-and it would be foolhardy to attempt a comprehensive
response in a preface to an essay on the Internet. But, at least a
rough sketch is essential to the argument that follows. Set forth
below, in very brief form, are the components of the vision-with
reasons) on characteristics that are related to
emphasis (for obvious
29
property.
intellectual
Consumer Welfare. I begin with the proposition-derived
directly from the utilitarian approach-that, other things being equal,
a society whose members are happy is better than one whose
members are (by their own lights) less happy. Applied to the field of
intellectual property, this guideline urges us to select a combination
of rules that will maximize consumer welfare by optimally balancing
incentives for creativity with incentives for dissemination and use.
This deceptively simple objective 0 does not, however, exhaust the set
of appropriate aspirations for the legal system. Rather, in a good
society, it would be tempered by a series of goals not reducible to
"the greatest good of the greatest number." The remainder of this
section discusses those goals.
A Cornucopia of Information and Ideas. An attractive culture
would be one in which citizens have access to a wide array of
information, ideas, and forms of entertainment-wider, perhaps, than
an unregulated market in intellectual products might produce.
Variety, in this sense, helps stimulate and enrich life. Access to a
broad range of intellectual products is also crucial to widespread
attainment of two related conditions central to most conceptions of
the good life-namely, self-determination3 and self-expression-both
by providing persons the materials crucial to self-construction, and by
fostering a general condition of cultural diversity, which (in ways best
described by John Stuart Mill) enables and compels individuals to
32
shape themselves.
29. Fuller descriptions of each component may be found in Fisher, Fair Use Doctrine, supra
note 5.
30. For a powerful-and very complex-analysis attempting to work out the implications
of this guideline for copyright law in general, see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's
Incentives-Access Paradigm,49 VAND. L. REV. 483 (1996).
31. To emphasize self-determination is to deny neither the fact that persons' identities are
to a substantial degree socially determined nor the value of persons' cultivating attachment to
groups. It is, rather, to recognize the importance of each individual taking some degree of
responsibility for herself. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859); George Kateb,
Democratic Individuality and the Claims of Politics, 12 POL. THEORY 331 (1984); Port Huron
Statement, in THE NEW LEFT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 166-67 (M. Teodori ed. 1969).
32. See WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT, THE SPHERE AND DUTIES OF GOVERNMENT 11-13
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A Rich Artistic Tradition. As Ronald Dworkin has persuasively
argued, the more complex and resonant the shared language of a

culture-including, above all, its "vocabulary of art"-the more
opportunities it affords its members for creativity and subtlety in
communication and thought.33 As Dworkin suggests, recognition of
that fact points toward governmental polices designed to make

available to the public "a rich stock of illustrative and comparative
collections [of art]" 34 and, more generally, to foster "a tradition of
[artistic] innovation.

'35

Distributive Justice. Specification of the ways in which wealth

36
would be distributed in a just society would take us very far afield.

For present purposes, a much more modest (though not trivial)
assertion should suffice: to the greatest extent practicable, all persons
should have access to the informational and artistic resources
described above.
Semiotic Democracy. In an attractive society, all persons would
be able to participate in the process of meaning-making. Instead of
being merely passive consumers of cultural artifacts produced by
others, they would be producers, helping to shape the world of ideas

and symbols in which they live. 37 Active engagement of this sort
would help both to sustain several of the features of the good lifee.g., meaningful work3 8 and self-determination-and to foster cultural
(Joseph Coulthard, Jr., trans., John Chapman 1854) (1852); ARTHUR 0. LOVEJOY, THE GREAT
CHAIN OF BEING: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 293-314 (1936); MILL, supra note 31;
1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 273-74 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1945)
(1835).
33. See Ronald Dworkin, Art as a Public Good, 9 COLUM. J. ART & L. 143, 153-57 (1985);
see also Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the InternationalTrade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REV. 275, 305-06
(1982).
34. See Dworkin, supra note 33, at 155.
35. See id. at 153-56.
36. For an opinionated review of the pertinent literature, see Fisher, Fair Use Doctrine,
supra note 5, at 1756.
37. Rich presentations of this ideal, with which I am in substantial agreement, may be
found in Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Propertyand Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property
Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853 (1991); Michael Madow, Private
Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 127-47
(1993); and Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283 (1996).
38. Meaningful work means a job that requires skill and concentration, presents the worker
with challenges she can meet only through the exercise of initiative and creativity, and is
embedded in a larger project she deems socially valuable and must take into account when
making her decisions. Not all jobs can conform closely to this ideal, of course, but to the extent
feasible, all persons should have access to work of this sort. See JON ELSTER, MAKING SENSE
OF MARX 74-82, 521 (1985); MARX, supra note 26, at 110-11, 137; ADAM SCHAFF, ALIENATION
AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON 57-62 (1980).
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diversity.
Sociability. Recognition of the importance to the good life of
self-determination does not point toward a society characterized by
radical individualism; on the contrary, it suggests that we strive to
cultivate a society rich in opportunities for community. To be willing
and able to avail oneself of a range of life choices, one must have a
secure sense of self and a capacity for reflection-attributes most
likely to be found in persons grounded in "communities of
memory."3 9 Moreover, persons' capacities to construct rewarding
lives will be enhanced if they have access to a variety of "constitutive"
groups-in "real" space and in "virtual" space. 4°
Respect. Semiotic democracy does not imply that persons should
be free to manipulate the creations of others without any restraints
whatsoever. Appreciation of the extent to which self-expression is
often a form of self-creation should make people respectful of others'
work.

41

There are tensions among some of the goals just canvassed-for
example, between the value of self-expression and the value of
respect. But for the most part, I contend, they hang together. They
reinforce one another and (if elaborated substantially) would
together constitute a coherent picture of an attractive society.
Substantiation of that bald assertion is plainly beyond the scope of
this essay. But my intention is to offer, not a list of ideals that pull in
inconsistent directions, but an integrated vision.
Armed with that (regrettably, but inevitably) brief sketch of a set
of aspirations, we can return to the problem at hand: the content of
the rules that should govern nonpermissive uses of material available
in cyberspace.

III.

REGULATING THE NET

What combination of default intellectual property rules for the
Internet and opportunities for contractual modification of those rules
would be most likely to advance the vision outlined above? The short
39. See ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 152-54 (1985).
40. See id. at 85-112; MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 147-50
(1982).
41. Cf. Eric M. Brooks, "Tilted" Justice: Site-Specific Art and Moral 2ights After U.S.
Adherence to the Berne Convention, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1431 (1989); Geri J. Yonover, The
"Dissing"of DaVinci: The Imaginary Case of Leonardo v. Duchamp: Moral Rights, Parody, and
Fair Use, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 935 (1995).

1998]

PROPERTY AND CONTRACT ON THE INTERNET

answer is that we can't be sure. The Internet is changing very fast; we
can't be certain what it will look like in a decade or even a year. For
that reason, I agree wholeheartedly with those commentators who
urge lawmakers to be cautious and not try to impose a permanent,
42
comprehensive regulatory regime on this protean medium.
Caution is also consistent with the methodology advocated in this
essay. The vision outlined in Part II is nothing more than a sketchor, to change metaphors, merely one contribution to an ongoing
conversation about the sort of society we wish to live in. The Internet
is a potentially revolutionary medium-socially, economically, and
politically. Engagement in and with it is bound to change our sense of
how we might implement our existing ideals. And, it may well alter
our values themselves. We should be open to such possibilities-and
should not foreclose them through premature efforts to impose order
on the system.
But, being cautious does not mean doing nothing. If we can
nudge the system in more attractive directions-or prevent it from
drifting in pernicious directions-we should do so, always leaving
open the possibility that whatever rules we adopt will have to be
modified soon. In that spirit, I propose that we move toward a
regulatory regime that combines a modest (though not trivial) set of
intellectual property rights for creators with significant (though not
unlimited) opportunities for contractual rearrangements of those
rights.
The following three sections describe and defend specific
components of that composite recommendation. While we are in the
midst of those trees, however, it is important not to lose sight of the
forest. The overall goal, remember, is to craft a system that, in the
aggregate, helps foster a just and attractive society.
IV. A MODEST SET OF DEFAULT ENTITLEMENTS
An important group of lobbyists, government officials, and
scholars have argued that the creators and distributors of intellectual
products currently enjoy too little protection against nonpermissive
uses of their works on the Internet. 43 Accordingly, they have urged
lawmakers-in the United States and in the World Intellectual

42. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 207, 210-14; Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743 (1995).
43. See supra note 10.
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Property Organization ("WIPO")-to tighten up the copyright
regime, giving the creators of original forms of expression effective
protection against cyberspace "piracy." For example, they commonly
advocate more generous interpretations of the terms "copying" and
"distribution" (thereby expanding copyright owners' ability to control
the manner in which their works are used); increased exposure of
Internet service providers for carrying infringing material;
constriction of the kinds of uses of copyrighted works privileged by
the fair-use doctrine; and strong proscriptions of encryptioncircumventing "black boxes.""
Most of these reforms are, I suggest, unnecessary and illadvised-unnecessary, because the ability of creators to collect
money from people who wish to gain access to their creations on the
Internet can be adequately protected by contractual and
technological options (discussed in Part V); ill-advised, because they
will unduly impede opportunities for transformative and socially
valuable nonpermissive uses of intellectual products (discussed in
Part VI). This is not to suggest, however, that we should dispense
with all intellectual property rights on the Web. A modest but not
insignificant set of entitlements do deserve protection through the
45
default rules. A tentative list of these is set forth below.
A. People, who intentionally or recklessly post copyrighted
material on the Internet, should be liable for copyright
infringement.
B. Creators' moral rights of attribution and disclosure should
be respected, but not their interests in integrity or
withdrawal.
C. "Framing" should be deemed a form of misappropriation,
but "deep linking" and "caching" should not.
A detailed defense of these propositions would take many pages.
Fortunately, however, the first and third have already been analyzed
persuasively by other scholars. I, therefore, will discuss them quickly,
incorporating by reference the work of my predecessors.
44. See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights
Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557 (1998). Cf. Hardy, supra
note 6 (arguing that the copyright system should be rejected in favor of an even more expansive
set of "pure" property rights).
45. An interesting related problem concerns when, if ever, persons who register as Internet
domain names should be liable for trademark infringement or dilution. Because there is already
a large scholarly literature on that topic, see Domain Names (visited June 4, 1999) <http://
eon.law.harvard.edu/property/domain/> [hereinafter Domain Names], and because it is largely
peripheral to the concerns addressed in this paper, I put it aside.
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A. Posting Copyrighted Material
There are two legitimate reasons why creators of intellectual
products might complain when their works are made available on the
Internet without their permission.
First, and most obviously,
nonpermissive posting may threaten their ability to derive revenue
from traditional markets for those works. Suppose, for example, that
a fan of a popular musician creates a website devoted to that musician
and then includes, in the collection of celebratory material, a menu of
the musician's (copyrighted) recordings. A visitor to the site can, by
clicking on the title of a particular recording, download to her own
computer a compressed digital copy of it, which she can then play (for
free) through her computer's speakers. If she has a read-write CDROM drive, she can use the downloaded files to prepare custom CDs,
which she (or her friends or customers) can then play through home
audio systems. 46 As the technology for making use of such sites
becomes more widely and cheaply available, 47 the construction of sites
like this plainly will erode the market for traditional musical
recordings. Much the same can be said for the increasingly common
practice of posting on the Web "bootleg" MPEG copies of
(copyrighted) movies. If it spreads, this activity clearly will erode the
rental market for videotapes and videodisks-and thus indirectly
impair the revenues that can be collected by movie companies.
Unless we curb behavior of these sorts, we run a serious risk of
eroding incentives for creativity.
Second, some creators have legitimate nonmonetary interests in
exercising some degree of control over how their works are
disseminated.
A painter or photographer may feel that the
distribution to the world of multiple digital copies of his creations
(the appearance of which inevitably deviates somewhat from the
originals) degrades his art. A musician who believes that nothing but
a live performance can convey the true spirit of his music may feel the
same way about bootleg recordings. Similar concerns may be found
46. The technology that makes this possible is known as MP3 (short for Motion Picture
Experts Group Layer 3 Compression Format). For a description of the technology and of
increasingly common uses of the Internet resembling those described in the text, see T.R. Reid
& Brit Hume, MP3 StandardEndows Music with Freedom of the Internet, BUFFALO NEWS, May
26, 1998, at E12.
47. See Leah Goldberg, Online Music DistributionHas Arrived, TECHWEB, March 16, 1998
<http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/TWB19980316SO020>. For an example of a commercial
site that may soon make use of the technology, see SonicNet: The Online Music Network (visited
June 4, 1999) <http://www.sonicnet.com>.
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in the letter, written by Gary Larson to the operator of a website
featuring his cartoons, in which he pleaded (successfully) with the
operator to cease and desist. 48 In short, the values of integrity and
respect may be impaired by posting works on the Net against the
wishes of their creators.
Current copyright law probably proscribes all of the activities
discussed above. Certainly the MPEG bootleggers are making

"copies" (or perhaps "derivative works") of the movies when they set
up their pirate website-and thus run afoul the provisions of section
106 of the American Copyright Act 49 and similar provisions in the
laws of other countries. But, what if the operator of such a site-say,
our hypothetical music fan-had acquired legitimately the copies of

48. The letter may be found (at least for the time being) at Gary Larson-Cartoon of the
Week (The Far Side) (visited June 4, 1999) <http://www.portmann.com/farside/>.
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
I'm walking a fine line here.
On the one hand, I confess to finding it quite flattering that some of my fans have
created web sites displaying and / or distributing my work on the Internet. And, on the
other, I'm struggling to find the words that convincingly but sensitively persuade these
Far Side enthusiasts to "cease and desist" before they have to read these words from
some lawyer.
What impact this unauthorized use has had (and is having) in tangible terms is,
naturally, of great concern to my publishers and therefore to me-but it's not the focus
of this letter. My effort here is to try and speak to the intangible impact, the emotional
cost to me, personally, of seeing my work collected, digitized, and offered up in
cyberspace beyond my control.
Years ago I was having lunch one day with the cartoonist Richard Guindon, and the
subject came up how neither one of us ever solicited or accepted ideas from others.
But, until Richard summed it up quite neatly, I never really understood my own
aversions to doing this: "It's like having someone else write in your diary," he said.
And how true that statement rang with me. In effect, we drew cartoons that we hoped
would be entertaining or, at the very least, not boring; but regardless, they would
always come from an intensely personal, and therefore original perspective.
To attempt to be "funny" is a very scary, risk-laden proposition. (Ask any stand-up
comic who has ever "bombed" on stage.) But if there was ever an axiom to follow in
this business, it would be this: be honest to yourself and -- most important -- respect
your audience.
So, in a nutshell (probably an unfortunate choice of words for me), I only ask that this
respect be returned, and the way for anyone to do that is to please, please refrain from
putting The Far Side out on the Internet. These cartoons are my "children," of sorts,
and like a parent, I'm concerned about where they go at night without telling me.
And, seeing them at someone's web site is like getting the call at 2:00 a.m. that goes,
"Uh, Dad, you're not going to like this much, but guess where I am."
I hope my explanation helps you to understand the importance this has for me,
personally, and why I'm making this request.
Please send my "kids" home. I'll be eternally grateful.
Most respectfully,
Gary Larson
49. 17 U.S.C. §106 (1994).
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the songs that he places on his hard drive and thereby makes
available to the world. In such a case, because he did not engage in
any nonpermissive copying, he might not be deemed to have violated
the Copyright Act-although, presumably, the fans who downloaded
the songs from his site would. To ensure that the person who sets up
such a site does not slip through the net of liability, the delegates at
the recent WIPO Conference in Geneva included a new Article 8 in
their Copyright Treaty which, when given teeth through
implementing legislation in the member countries, would make clear
that authors enjoy the exclusive right to "authoriz[e] any
communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless
means, including the making available to the public of their works in
such a way that members of the public may access these works from a
place and at a time individually chosen by them."50 For the reasons
suggested above, this adjustment (or clarification) of current law
seems wise.
In short, copyright law has an important role to play on the
Internet in preventing the deliberate uploading of material without
the permission of its creators. However, to address that problem, we
may not need to apply current copyright doctrine in all its glory to
this new medium. Copyright infringement is a strict-liability offense.
If a person without permission engages in any of the activities listed in
section 106 of the statute,"' he is exposed to a wide range of serious
penalties regardless of his intent or state of mind. Wholesale
adoption of this regime would render actionable many activities that
pose no significant threat to creators' legitimate interests-like
posting on the Web a recording of an interview taken in a caf6 where
a Bob Dylan song happens to have been playing in the background.52
A better system would be one limiting liability to persons who engage
in the activities proscribed by section 106 intentionally or with
reckless disregard for the copyright status of the works they upload.
A state-of-mind requirement of that sort might also provide a
solution to the problem of Internet-service-provider ("ISP") liability
that has bedeviled both courts and commentators. 3 What happens
50. See WIPO Copyright Treaty (visited June 4, 1999) <http://www.wipo.org/eng/diplconf/
distrib/94dc.htm>.
51. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
52. This example is drawn from a semi-serious dispute between Prof. Charles Nesson and
the company that manages the copyrights in Dylan's songs.
53. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communications Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995);
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when the subscriber to a service like CompuServe uses the company's
facilities to upload-and thus make available to the world-infringing
material?
Should CompuServe (in addition to the individual

subscriber) be liable for copyright infringement-either directly or
"contributorily"?
On one hand, as Niva Elkin-Koren has
persuasively argued, imposing liability on ISPs under such
circumstances would likely compel them to police the behavior of the

customers.54 The unavoidable crudity of that supervision would, in
turn, severely curtail the opportunities generated by the Internet for
semiotic democracy. On the other hand, enforcement of a rule
against unauthorized uploading of copyrighted material would be

difficult if ISPs could with impunity knowingly carry infringing
material on their servers and ignore the complaints of copyright
owners who become aware of infringing conduct. A rough but
attractive compromise between these two concerns could be achieved
by making the ISPs liable if, and only if, they intentionally or
recklessly carry infringing material-either by knowingly allowing it

to be posted in the first instance or (more likely) by failing to remove
it when notified by the copyright owners.5
Frank Music Corp. v. Compuserve, No. 93-8153 (S.D.N.Y., filed Nov. 29, 1994) (dismissed with
prejudice and without costs or attorney fees to any party, Dec. 19, 1995).
54. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information
Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators,13 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345 (1995).
55. In October 1998, while this article was in press, Congress adopted H.R. 2281, popularly
known as the Digital Millenium Copyright Act or DMCA. Available in (visited June 4, 1999)
<http://www.hrrc.org/2281enrolled.pdf>. Title II of the Act (known as the Online Copyright
Infringement Liability Limitation Act) limits the liability of Internet service providers in a
fashion roughly congruent with the recommendations offered in the text. The pertinent sections
of the statute provide that:
(1) A service provider shall not be liable ... for infringement of copyright by reason
of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or
network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service
provider(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the
material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to
remove, or disable access to, the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to
control such activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3),
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (1998). An ISP can only claim the benefit of the "safe harbor" provisions
described above if it "has designated an agent to receive notifications of claimed infringement."
Id. § 512(c)(2).
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Finally, it should be emphasized that the usual defenses to
copyright liability would continue to be available in this context. So,
for example, uploading material under circumstances that would, in
any other medium, be excused by the fair-use doctrine (e.g.,
uploading short excerpts for the purposes of criticism or parody)
would continue to be privileged.
Would such a regime ensure that copyrighted material is never
posted on the Web without the permission of the owners? Of course
not. There would be leakage-as there is through all of the barriers
erected by intellectual property law. But there is reason to be
optimistic that the leakage would not become a flood. Most
importantly, in the past few months, technologies capable of detecting
wrongful posting of copyrighted material have become widely-and
Those technologies
reasonably cheaply-available to creators.
include digital watermarks, digital fingerprinting, search engines that
prowl the Net looking for infringing material, and bits of code buried
in digital works that (like the harp in "Jack and the Beanstalk") alert
their owners when they are being copied without permission.5 6 Such
devices, combined with the severe penalties the Copyright Act
provides for willful violations, 7 should be sufficient to keep the
leakage to a tolerable level.
B. Moral Rights
An artist's "moral rights" are conventionally understood to
include the following entitlements: (a) a "right of integrity" (a right
not to have one's creations mutilated or destroyed); (b) a "right of
attribution" (encompassing the rights to be given credit for one's
work, to publish anonymously or pseudononymously, and not to be
given credit for a work one did not create); (c) a "right of disclosure"
(the right to determine when and how one's work is first released to
Because of the strong incentives created by the statute for ISPs to avail themselves of its
protections, there is some danger that they will remove material too hastily. But, with that
exception, the particular provision of the DMCA seems sensible. For commentary on the
statute, see Jonathan Band, The Digital Millenium Copyright Act (visited June 4, 1999) <http://
www.dfc.org/html/jb-memo.html>.
56. See John Dodge, Searchingfor 'Net Pirates:Firms Turn to Cyber Dick Tracys to Protect
Products, Nab Bad Guys, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 15, 1998, at C4; Luisa Simone, Digital
Watermarks: Copyright Protection for Online Artists, PC MAG., Feb. 18, 1997, at 30; Glenn R.
Simpson, A '90s Espionage Tale Stars Software Rivals, E-Mail Spy, WALL ST. J. Oct. 25, 1995, at
B1; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Digital 'Watermarks' Assert Internet Copyright, N.Y. TIMES, June 30,
1997, at Dll.
57. See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (Supp. III 1997).
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the public); (d) a "right of withdrawal" (the authority to remove one's
works from public circulation-usually understood to carry with it a
duty to indemnify the persons from whose possession it is
withdrawn); and (e) a "droit de suite" (the right to collect resale
royalties). No legal system in the world currently protects fully all of
these entitlements, but European regimes typically shield a much
larger subset of them than state or federal law in the United States.58
Should entitlements of these sorts be protected on the Internet?
Entitlement (c), the "right of disclosure," seems important for the
reasons similar to those explored in the preceding section: It is closely
connected with creators' interests in privacy and in controlling the
faces they present to the world.5 9 Lack of protection for this right
would also distort the creative process-for example, by making
creators unduly secretive in order to shield embryonic forms of their
works from premature release. 60 Last but not least, recognition of this
right is essential to protect a creator's ability to demand
compensation from users of his work.
Entitlement (b), the "right of attribution," seems worthy of
protection for a different reason: Permitting an author both to claim
credit for work he has produced and to avoid being credited with
work he has not produced seems central to the ideal of respect
identified in Part II of this essay. Many of the same intuitions that
underlie our understandings and customary practices concerning
plagiarism also rightly make us cringe at the notion that someone
could make a copy of an artifact I had posted on the Web, and
recirculate it under his own name. Equally worrisome is the notion
that someone could copy one of my works, modify it substantially,
and then recirculate it with my name still attached to it. If (as seems
likely) the largely extralegal sanctions that limit the incidence of
plagiarism in other media 61 will have little grip on the Internet, we
should be chary of curtailing copyright protection so far as to remove
all disincentives to engage in such behavior.
A firm defense of moral rights would go even further. Shouldn't
creators be able to object when their works are mutilated and then
58. See Yonover, supra note 41, at 995-97.
59. See Paine, supra note 25, at 251.
60. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
61. See, e.g., Frank Ahrens, A Writer's Repetitive Stress: New Republik; Admits Phrases
Were Copied,WASH. POST, July 18, 1995, at Cl; Sinead O'Brien, For Barnicle, One Controversy
Too Many, AM. JOURNALISM REv. (Sept. 1998), also available in (visited June 4, 1999) <http://
ajr.newslink.org/ajrbarniclesept98.html>.
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recirculated (even without their names attached)?6 2 If you have come
to regret a work you posted on the Net, shouldn't you be able to
withdraw it?
Perhaps, but the benefits secured through the
protection of such rights would be swamped by the concomitant
threats to other aspects of the society we wish to promote.
Specifically, the resultant curtailment of opportunities for selfexpression and semiotic democracy would be severe.
Protection of the right of attribution, fortunately, would have few
side-effects of this sort. Little would be lost and much would be
gained by requiring Net users, when they copied substantial portions
of a work, to leave the name of its creator on it. But what if they
modified the work sufficiently to make the creator regret the
retention of his name? The appropriate norm in that context is less
obvious, but the following might work: If person A creates a work,
posts a copy on the Internet, and indicates in the document itself the
URL where it may be found, and person B then modifies the work
and makes it available on the Net in modified form (either in isolation
or as a part of some composite work), then B must not remove A's
URL-i.e., A's indication of a site where an unadulterated version of
the work may be found. It would then be A's responsibility to
63
maintain that site.
Discussion of entitlement (e), the "droit de suite" is postponedfor reasons that will become apparent-to Part V of this essay.
C. Framing,Linking, and Caching
One of the ways in which producers (and compilers) of
informational products have sought to make money on the Internet
has been through the sale of advertisements. In the simplest form of
this strategy, newspaper N creates a website containing all (or more
commonly, a portion of) N's articles. Visitors to the site arrive first at
an index or "homepage," which contains links to other pages
containing
individual
articles.
The homepage
contains
advertisements, while the subordinate pages do not. A more complex
62. Activities of these sorts are already multiplying. One website, for example, features the
images of a variety of "alternative Barbies" ("Possessed Barbie," "Fat and Ugly Barbie,"
"'Mentally Challenged' Barbie," etc.) that, not surprisingly, have enraged Mattel. See Mark
Napier, Excerpts From The DistortedBarbie (visited June 4, 1999) <http://ezone.org:1080/ez/e7/
articles/napier/barbie.html>. For a provocative discussion organized by Elizabeth Rosenblatt
and Jen Carpenter of Barbie dispute and similar, related controversies, see Respect & Integrity
(visited June 4, 1999) <http://eon.law.harvard.edu/property/respect/>.
63. See Litman, supra note 11.
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version of the same strategy entails posting advertisements, not
merely on the homepage, but in a frame that surrounds the textual

material in all subordinate pages as well.64
At least three sorts of activities threaten the effectiveness of

these strategies. First, X-a rival of N, or simply a party unrelated to
N-can establish in its own homepage links to subordinate pages in
N's system. Internet users who gain access to N's system through X's
homepage rather than through N's homepage thus miss the first wave
Second, X may go further, placing
of N's advertisements.
advertisements in a frame around its own homepage-a frame that
obscures comparable advertising frames on N's subordinate pages

when users link to them. Third, X may organize its system in such a
way that it "caches" for substantial periods of time N's homepage-in
other words, stores N's page on X's system. The result is that there
will be a delay between the time when N changes its advertisements
and the time when those changes appear on the version of N's page

that users see when they gain access to it through X's page.
N might invoke at least two doctrines in an effort to halt these
practices. 65 First, each of these activities might be characterized as

"copying" (at least for brief periods of time in the memory of a
computer) without permission N's copyrighted material-and thus
deemed to violate the Copyright Act. 66 Second, N might argue that X

is "misappropriating" the "hot news" contained in the articles-which
N had gathered through the expenditures of substantial labor and
67
money-in violation of state unfair-competition law.

64. For an excellent review of the technology that makes each of these connections
possible, and a careful study of the legal issues they present, see Maureen A. O'Rourke, Fencing
Cyberspace:Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 MINN. L. REv. 609, 631 (1998).
65. Other, more esoteric legal theories may be available. For example, N might claim that
X has "diluted" N's trademark, or that X, by "framing" N's material, has created a "derivative
work" in violation of section 106(2) of the Copyright Act, or that, by creating links that enable
surfers to copy (albeit briefly in RAM) the material in N's articles, X has engaged in
contributory copyright infringement. See, e.g., Brad Templeton, Linking Rights (visited June 4,
1999) <http://www.templetons.com/bradIlinkright.html>.
66. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
67. Several cases have arisen in which such arguments have been raised. Thus far,
however, all have been settled-so the law remains unclear. See, e.g., AltaVista Cannot Use Its
Name on Productsor Services, MA Judge Says, 10 SOFTWARE L. BULL. 81 (1997); Matt Jackson,
Linking Copyright to Homepages, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 731 (1997); Martin J. Elgison & James
M. Jordan III, Trademark Cases Arise from Meta-Tags, Frames:Disputes Involve Search-Engine
Indexes, Web Sites Within Web Sites, as Well as Hyperlinking, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 20, 1997, at C6;
Microsoft's Link to Ticketmaster Site Spurs Trademark Lawsuit, COMPUTER & ONLINE INDUS.
LITIG. REP., May 6, 1997 at 24,087; Jacqueline Paige, Scottish Court Orders Online Newspaper
to Remove Links to Competitor's Web Site, BNA PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY,
Nov. 4, 1996; Shetland Islands Linking Lawsuit Settled, COMPUTER L. STRATEGIST, Nov. 1997,
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Should N prevail under either of these theories? We are unlikely
to answer that question sensibly by extrapolating from the ways in
which copyright law and misappropriation doctrine have been applied
in other contexts.
(This is especially true with regard to
misappropriation, which is a notoriously inconsistent and
unpredictable field.) A much more promising strategy would ask
whether application of these theories would be likely to promote the
set of cultural conditions sketched in Part II.
Because all three of the activities described above would reduce
N's revenue (and thus erode N's incentive to construct websites of
this sort in the first instance) we should be wary of them-for the
obvious reason, that they would reduce the production of
informational works. Unless the availability of these options served
other, more important ends, we should interpret one or another of
68
the available doctrines to proscribe them.
Do these activities serve other, important ends? With respect to
"deep linking" (the first of the activities described above), the answer
would seem to be yes. Deep links have two valuable functions: they
make it much easier for users of the Net to gain access to the sort of
material they want and need; and the act of constructing them is an
important way in which people express themselves and help take
control of the meaning of the Net. Deep linking, consequently,
should be permitted.
With regard to "framing," however, the answer would seem to be
no. Neither self-expression nor semiotic democracy would be
materially advanced by permitting deep linkers to obscure, with their
own advertising frames, the advertisements on the pages to which
they link. It is true that a ban on framing would reduce the incentives
for people to set up sites like X's, which in turn would diminish to
some degree the ease with which surfers could move around the
Internet. But, this effect seems less substantial and important than
the effects of the alternative: eroding N's incentive to create its site in
at 2; Hypertext Linking Called Into Question (visited June 4, 1999) <http://www.ljx.com/
LJXfiles/ticketmaster>; Courtney Macavinta, Linking a Copyright Violation?, CNET NEWS.COM
(Dec. 11, 1997) <http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,17233,00.html>.
68. It may make a difference which doctrine we pick to proscribe a particular activity. For
example, it may be difficult to contend that framing constitutes copyright infringement without
either amending the Copyright Act or casting a cloud over many other activities on the Web
that we plainly would wish to permit. Those implications may make the misappropriation
theory, despite its notorious ambiguity, a more attractive doctrinal hook in this particular
context. This and many other nuances involving the legal status of linking, framing, and caching
are thoroughly explored in O'Rourke, supra note 64.
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the first instance, and impairing N's ability to control the manner in
which its material is presented to viewers. So, framing should
probably be proscribed.
"Caching" is harder to assess, but the balance seems to tilt in
favor of permitting the activity-partly because of its advantages from
users' standpoints (it dramatically reduces the time that a visitor to
X's site must wait before seeing N's site) and partly because the
threat to N's revenues (and thus N's incentives) seems modest.
It should be emphasized that the judgments ventured in the
preceding three paragraphs are tentative, and technological
innovations might trump them altogether. 69 They are offered in the
hope of modeling a method for addressing such questions, not as
definitive answers.
D. Commissions and Omissions
The default rules outlined above assign to creators more
entitlements than are advocated by "copyright minimalists. ' 70 An
Internet organized on the basis of such default rules plainly would not
be a "copyright-free zone." On the other hand, the proposed regime
falls far short of the package of entitlements advocated by the
"copyright maximalists. ' '71
Very few of the recommendations
contained in the now-notorious "White Paper, '72 for example, are
included. In addition, in one crucial respect, the proposed system is
less protective of creators' interests than current copyright law: It
contemplates that users of the Net would not be liable for copyright
infringement for viewing, downloading, copying, or retransmitting
any material they find on the Net-including material posted in
73
contravention of the guidelines set forth in section A.
69. See, e.g., Templeton, supra note 65. "It's also worth pointing out that it is possible,
though a pain, to build a web server so that access to internal pages is done through everchanging URLs with magic cookies that only appear in the binding or navigating pages. This
technique can prevent people from offering links to internal pages or doing inline inclusions of
other people's graphics because each URL works only once." For other technological ways of
discouraging linking and framing, see O'Rourke, supra note 64, at 646.
70. Seesupra note 11.
71. See supra note 10.
72. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995), available in (visited June 4, 1999) <http://
www.law.vill.edu/chron/articles/nii/nii.htm> [hereinafter WHITE PAPER].
73. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text. In this respect, the default rules
advocated here are even less protective of copyright owners than the recommendations of
several of the "minimalists." See Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic,
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Why withdraw that seemingly fundamental stick from the bundle
of entitlements enjoyed by copyright owners? A facile response is
that it is largely infeasible to detect and police putatively infringing
behavior of this sort, so copyright owners would not be losing much.
A more serious answer is that the freedom to read, copy, and (with
the limited restrictions discussed in section B, above) transform
material one finds on the Net would go far toward advancing the
diverse, stimulating, playful, participatory, and egalitarian society
sketched in Part II.
But what about the revenues of creators? If they can't make
money on the Net, because users can view or copy their creations free
of charge, won't they keep their material off the Net-or, worse yet,
reduce their levels of production altogether?
If they had no
alternative way of using the Web to raise revenue, that concern would
be very serious. The following two Parts, however, outline an
alternative system for protecting creators' legitimate interests in
controlling access to their material-a system that, compared to the
copyright regime, entails fewer transaction costs, greater economic
efficiency, a more egalitarian system for regulating access to
intellectual products, and greater attention to the cultural values
celebrated in this essay.
V. PERMISSIBLE MODIFICATIONS OF THE DEFAULT RULES

The principal claim of the remainder of this essay is that some
kinds of contractual or technological rearrangements of the
entitlements described in the preceding section should be permitted,
but others should be proscribed. This section contains an illustrative
set of desirable rearrangements. Part VI describes some that should
be disallowed.
A. Access Charges
Let's begin with a relatively easy case. Should Frank be allowed
to demand a fee from Grace in return for permitting her to download
the novel from his website? It is hard to see why not. Surely, Frank
would be permitted to demand from Grace a fee in return for
providing her a "hard" copy of the novel. That, after all, is the way
novelists (through the intermediation of publishers) ordinarily make
Outdated, and Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 631 (1996); Litman, supra note
11, at 41-43.
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money. Allowing Frank to make a similar demand for Internet access
to his creation would not seem to run afoul any of the values
catalogued in Part II. At least provisionally, therefore, we should
permit the parties to rearrange their entitlements to this extent.
B. Copy Protection
Frank's ability to charge Grace for access to his novel will enable
him to generate some income. However, unless he can prevent Grace
from producing multiple copies of the novel, his revenue-gathering
power will be sharply limited. Grace will buy a single copy, use
digital copying technology to make a virtually unlimited number of
copies at minimal cost, and sell (or give) those copies to Frank's
potential customers. Witnessing this sequence of events, potential
authors, who are not independently wealthy or willing to live in
garrets, will despair. Realizing that they will never be able to recoup
the costs of creation (in the form of time, effort, word-processors, and
foregone opportunities), they will abandon their craft and become
lawyers. The net result is that the world will be deprived of their
potential creations.
The social desirability of avoiding this familiar scenario is the
primary traditional economic justification for copyright law. The
problem with intellectual products, it has often been said, is that they
Like lighthouses, they can be enjoyed by
are "public goods."
unlimited numbers of persons without being "used up," and (partly as
a result) it is difficult to prevent persons who have not paid for them
from enjoying them. These circumstances are likely to lead to their
underproduction. To avoid that danger, we forbid consumers to
reproduce (certain kinds of) intellectual products, thereby enhancing
the ability of their creators to charge for access and sustaining the
incentives for their creation.
Two considerations, however, suggest that these traditional
objectives of copyright law could be achieved more effectively and
efficiently through the use of contracts and copy-protection
technology. First, technological shields are likely to be far more
effective on the Net than copyright doctrine. As many observers of
the new medium have noted, the ease with which digital materials can
(in the absence of technological safeguards) be reproduced, the
difficulty of detecting such reproduction, and the strongly anarchic
culture of the Net, in combination, make piracy rampant. Section
IV.A., above, identified some reasons for cautious optimism about

19981

PROPERTY AND CONTRACT ON THE INTERNET

our capacity to detect and punish deliberate and large-scale
Barring a
nonpermissive postings of copyrighted material.7"
technological breakthrough enabling such detection, however, our
ability to prevent ordinary users of the Net from copying and
retransmitting materials they find there is likely to be extremely
limited. Copy protection technology, though surely not absolutely
secure, is far more effective.
Second, transaction costs are likely to be substantially lower if we
permit producers to employ the contract/technology strategy rather
than limiting them to the copyright protections. Many of these
mechanisms are essentially self-enforcing; consumers are simply
unable to make use of the products unless they comply with the
producers' conditions. By contrast, the total public and private costs
of enforcing copyright laws on the Internet-even if it could be done
effectively-would be very large. To be sure, the contract/technology
regime would not be costless; to keep ahead of hackers, producers
would be obliged to continue refining their information-protecting
technology. But the need to innovate-and the associated social
waste-could be much reduced through the adoption of anti75
circumvention statutes.
The benefits of copy-protection technology are not unalloyed,
however. Liberating creators to use it will likely have two regrettable
side effects. First, by using copy-protection technology, creators can
engross greater power than they are allocated by copyright law, and
permitting them to exercise this power would threaten several of the
ideals catalogued in Part II. For example, creators would be able,
thereby, to prevent others from copying portions of their works in
order to parody them-something they most likely cannot do using
copyright law. Similarly, a copyright expires at some point (currently,
depending on the pertinent jurisdiction, the lifetime of the author
plus 50 or 70 years). Many commentators think that term is excessive,
but at least it has a limit. Copy-protection technology, by contrast,
would enable creators to keep their works out of the public domain
forever-thereby both reducing public access to their creations and
impeding the ability of other creators to build upon them.
Second, copy-protection technology (as noted above) can be
74. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
75. Cf. Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REv. 241 (1998) (summarizing the analogous indirect-cost argument
for trade-secret protection).
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employed by the creators of kinds of material that either would not
be eligible for copyright at all or would enjoy only "thin" protection.
The most important example is databases-"white-page" telephone
directories; compilations of primary legal materials; etc. 76 It is
commonly thought that excluding such things from the ambit of
copyright is wise, insofar as adequate incentives already exist for their
creation. Enabling creators to circumvent that exclusion using
technology may thus be socially undesirable.
For the time being, I merely note these drawbacks of permitting
creators to substitute technological for legal protection. Whether
they can somehow be neutralized I leave to Part VI.
C. Price Discrimination
From the standpoint of creators (and, I will argue, from the
standpoint of society at large) contracts and technology have an
additional potential advantage over the copyright regime. To
understand it requires a brief foray into the world of microeconomics.
When the creator of an intellectual product for which there are
no good substitutes (a decent novel, for example) is awarded a
copyright, she becomes a monopolist. In other words, she need no
longer fear that, if she charges more for each copy of her work than
the marginal cost of producing it, she will be undersold by a rival
producer-because now she (or her licensees) has the exclusive right
to make copies of the work. If she wishes to maximize her profits
(and, for simplicity, we will assume for the moment that that is her
only goal), she will thus charge substantially more than marginal cost.
If she has good information concerning the potential demand for her
work, she will adopt the strategy indicated in Figure 1:

76. See Deborah Tussey, Owning the Law: Intellectual Property Rights in Primary Law, 9
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 173 (1998).
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Figure 1: Profit-Maximizing Behavior by a Copyright Owner
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By offering her books at price B, she is able to sell quantity F,
yielding the profits represented by the shaded area. Should we be
disturbed by the fact that she is able, in this fashion, to make so much
money? Not at all. The whole point of intellectual property
protection (for the reasons discussed in the preceding section 77) is, by
holding out to potential creators the chance of earning profits of this
sort, to induce them to produce socially valuable things they would
otherwise not produce. But, adoption of this strategy is not costless.
More specifically, it alters the fortunes of consumers in the fashions
suggested by Figure 2:

77. See supra section V.B.
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Figure 2: Economic Effects of Profit-Maximizing Behavior
by a Copyright Owner
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Consumers able and willing to pay more than price B for the
product (i.e., consumers represented by line OF) plainly are worse off
than if they had been able to obtain it for the marginal cost of
producing it (price C). Put differently, their consumer surplus (the
difference between the value they place on the product and the price
they pay for it) has been reduced from zone ACED (rectangle 1 plus
triangle 2) to zone ABD (triangle 2). More seriously, consumers
represented by line FH (i.e., those who are not able and willing to pay
price B) are "priced out of the market" altogether. In the vernacular
of economics, the result is a "deadweight loss" in the form of a loss of
potential consumer surplus represented by zone DEG (triangle 3).78
Can't our hypothetical author somehow gain access to the
market represented by line FH? Isn't there some way that she could
offer her work to poorer (or less eager) consumers without foregoing
the profits she makes from the eager buyers? For that matter, can't
she contrive some way to charge the very eager consumers (clustered
78. More precisely, the deadweight loss is represented by the difference between the size of
zone DEG and the consumer surplus those consumers are able to reap by purchasing their nextmost-desirable good or service. Because that refinement does not materially alter the analysis
presented in the text, it will be ignored in the ensuing discussion.
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close to the vertical axis on this graph) more than price B? Fine
tuning of this sort is known as price discrimination.19 The current
copyright system limits the ability of creators to subdivide markets in
this way, primarily through the first-sale doctrine.80 A marginal
consumer, to whom the author sells the product at a low price, may,
under current doctrine, resell his copy to an eager consumer for a
higher price, thereby depriving the author of the revenue she could
have received from the latter.81 Opportunities for arbitrage of this

sort radically limit the author's ability to differentiate among
consumers.82
If we permit our hypothetical author to limit access to her work
through customized contracts and technology, her ability to engage in
price discrimination will increase sharply.83 The primary reason is
that she will be able, using such systems, to forbid or prevent
consumers from reselling the copies they purchase. Once arbitrage

has been shut down, all sorts of techniques for subdividing her market
become available. She can charge businesses a high price, individual
consumers a lower price, and students a still lower price. She can tie
prices to the frequency with which each consumer uses the product.
She can establish a system of "microcharges"-under which
consumers pay a small amount for each bit of information they
employ84 The economic effects of such techniques are represented in
79. See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 320-22 (2d ed. 1980). In an earlier essay, I explored the relationship between
price discrimination and copyright law and argued that the fair-use doctrine should be construed
to facilitate such discrimination. See Fisher, Fair Use Doctrine, supra note 5, at 1709-10, 1742.
The present essay builds on that analysis.
80. The contours of and limitations on the first-sale doctrine-and the relationship
between that doctrine and the practice of price discrimination-are thoroughly discussed in
Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright Protection of
DigitalWorks, 45 BUFF. L. REv. 845 (1997).
81. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
82. Some degree of price discrimination is still possible-typically by segregating the
market chronologically. Thus, for example, hardcover editions of novels are typically sold at
high prices to eager and wealthy consumers; after the demand for the hard-cover edition has
subsided, a paperback edition is made available to less eager consumers for a much lower price.
More refined versions of the same technique underlie the seemingly contorted ways in which
motion pictures are marketed. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY 8 (1994). But
the first-sale doctrine sharply limits the possibilities for non-chronological subdivisions of
markets.
83. See Meurer, supra note 80, at 874-75.
84. An example might give this analysis more texture: Suppose that you had the option,
instead of receiving each morning a paper copy of your municipal daily newspaper (say, the
Boston Globe), of viewing on a computer screen (or a paper printout) only those portions of the
paper in which you were interested. If you wanted to see the whole paper on a given day, you
would be charged 15 cents. (Why so much less than the cost of the paper version? Because the
newspaper company would save the cost of printing and delivering the paper copy.) If you
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Figure 3:
Figure 3: Economic Impact of Partial Price Discrimination
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To milk the market to best advantage, the author divides the
pool of consumers into segments, and then charges the members of
each group what the author thinks they are able and willing to spend.
Thus, on the simplified assumptions embodied in Figure 3, she will
charge the consumers represented by line 0-U price p, charge
consumers U-V price q, charge consumers V-W price r, charge
consumers W-X price s, and charge consumers X-Y price t.
By engaging in price discrimination of this sort, our hypothetical
author has been able to increase her monopoly profits substantially.
(Compare the size of zone 1 in Figure 3 with the size of zone 1 in
Figure 1.) Plainly, that is good from the standpoint of creators. Is
wanted to read only the Sports section or only the front page, you would be charged 10 cents. If
you wanted to see only the news about the Red Sox, you would be charged 5 cents. If you were
enrolled in a college or university, all of these prices would be reduced by one third. If you lived
in Concord, Massachusetts (a wealthy suburb), all of these prices would be increased by one
third. (Of course, if you were too busy on a given morning to read the paper, you would not be
charged anything.)
In all of these cases, you would be prevented-either legally or
technologically or both-form redistributing the news you received to your neighbors, coworkers, etc. When and how would you pay these fees? Most likely, they would appear as a
monthly charge on your credit card bill. In short, instead of writing a separate check to the
newspaper company, you would write a check in a slightly larger amount to Mastercard.
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that bad from the standpoint of society at large?

Not necessarily.

Before passing judgment, we should at least consider the impact of
her marketing strategies on other parties. Notice that price
discrimination has substantially reduced the consumer surplus
enjoyed by wealthy and eager buyers (near the Y axis), but has made

the product available to a much larger set of consumers, who are now
enjoying surpluses of their own. Whether total consumer surplus has
increased or decreased is impossible to determine s5 But, we can say
with confidence that many more consumers are now benefiting from

the author's creation. To rephrase the point in terms consistent with
Part II of this essay, price discrimination leads to substantial

improvements in distributive justice-better approximation of the
ideal of affording all persons access to works of the intellect86
85. See W. KiP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 290-95 (2d
ed. 1995); Meurer, supra note 80, at 897-98.
The probability that permitting creators to engage in partial price discrimination would
enhance rather than reduce consumer surplus would be increased, however, if we measured
consumer surplus using "asking" prices rather than "offer" prices. The analysis presented in the
text conforms to the convention of contemporary law-and-economics scholars in measuring the
value to consumers of a good or service (in this case, a novel) by the amount of money that
consumers would be able and willing to pay for it-i.e., their "offer" prices. But, as James Boyle
observed in commenting on a draft of this article, there is no principled reason why we should
not measure its value to consumers by the amount of money they would demand in return for
surrendering the good or service in question-i.e., their "asking" prices. For a variety of
reasons, "asking" prices ordinarily are higher than "offer" prices. See, e.g., Mark Kelman,
Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L.
REv. 669 (1979); Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible
Indifference Curves, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 1277 (1989). More relevant to the present inquiry,
however, is the fact that the gap between "asking" and "offer" prices is ordinarily larger for
poor persons than for rich persons-because the so-called "endowment effect" (one of the
sources of the gap) decreases with wealth. With these rough generalizations in mind, take
another look at the differences between Figure 2 and Figure 3. The consumers clustered near
the vertical axis (e.g., those represented by the line O-U in Figure 3) most likely are, on average,
wealthier than those further from the vertical axis (e.g., those represented by the line X-Y in
Figure 3). Why? Because ability and willingness to pay for entertainment [among other things]
ordinarily increases with wealth.
Notice that the effect of permitting our hypothetical creator to engage in price
discrimination is that the consumer surplus enjoyed by persons closer to the vertical axis shrinks
while the consumer surplus enjoyed by person further from the vertical axis increases. See JEAN
TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 137-39 (1988). If we used "asking"
prices rather than "offer" prices, the injury sustained by wealthy consumers and the benefit
enjoyed by poorer consumers would both be larger than the two graphs suggest. But the effect
would be more dramatic for the poorer consumers-precisely because they are poor. In other
words, using "asking" prices would magnify the benefits more than the injuries attributable to
price discrimination. None of this requires us to alter the generalization ventured in the text:
namely, that the net impact on consumer surplus of partial price discrimination is indeterminate.
But it does increase somewhat the likelihood that the net impact will be positive.
86. But, won't price discrimination reduce the access to digital material of users who value
it highly-i.e. those located near the vertical axis on Figure 3? Yes-in the sense that such highvalue users will be forced to pay more than they would in the absence of price discrimination.
But it would plainly be senseless for the creators to charge that subset of their market more than
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Price discrimination has other advantages as well. Notice that
triangle 3 in Figure 3-representing deadweight losses caused by
enabling the author to wield market power-is substantially smaller
than triangle 3 in Figure 2. Moreover, the ratio of the monopoly

profits enjoyed by the author to the concomitant deadweight losses
(i.e., the ratio of zone 1 to triangle 3) is much larger in Figure 3. So
what? That means, first of all, that social welfare losses have been

reduced.87 In addition, we are getting much more bang for our
bucks8--a much larger incentive for creative activity per unit of social
cost. Such a system of rules, applied to the Internet, should move us

faster than a copyright-based system in the direction of an
informational society and rich artistic tradition.
To summarize, the use of contracts and technological protections
to enable creators to engage in price discrimination would produce
the following differences from the current copyright regime:
1. It would enable creators to make more money.

2.

It would increase the ratio between the incentives for

3.

creativity and the concomitant deadweight losses-and thus
should enhance net consumer welfare.
It would increase the likelihood that all persons would have

access to works of the intellect.
Measured against the vision offered in Part II, the second and
third of these effects seem plainly desirable. The first effect is less
obviously advantageous-but we will consider, later in this essay,s9 a
way in which it might be put to good use.

VI. COMPULSORY TERMS
The considerations reviewed in the preceding section should be
the price they were willing to spend. So, they will still have access; it will simply be costly.
A more subtle point has been suggested in conversation by Mark Lemley: Will not people
who wish to put the novel to some transformative use (parody it, use a character from it in her
own novel, etc.) be included in this cluster of high-value users, and shouldn't we be especially
concerned about discouraging them? The answer is yes-and a way of addressing this concern
is outlined in section VI.C., infra.
87. This assertion must be qualified by the recognition that price discrimination is not
costless. Creators have to set up and administer the systems for differentiating classes of
consumers, the consumers themselves have to spend time clicking on the appropriate icons and
paying the microcharges when they appear on their credit-card bills, etc. But the fluidity of the
Internet is sufficient to keep those transaction costs remarkably low. Cf. Merges, supra note 17.
The generalization offered in the text is thus likely to hold.
88. Cf. Louis Kaplow, The Patent-AntitrustIntersection: A Reappraisal,97 HARV. L. REV.
1813 (1984) (developing this argument in the context of patent law).
89. See infra pp. 1249-50.
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sufficient to establish a prima facie case for permitting producers of
material on the Internet to use contracts and technology to limit the
ways in which consumers use their products. Unfortunately, this is
not the end of the story. Given the authority to adopt such strategies,
producers would be likely to use them in ways we would find less
socially beneficial. A good sense of the range of conditions producers
would be likely to demand from consumers can be obtained from
Mark Lemley's recent essay examining the use of shrinkwrap
licenses. 90 Lemley found that the licenses currently used by software
manufacturers commonly contain terms of the following sorts: 91
a) Restraints on resale or rental by the consumer of his copy of
the product;
b) Limits on the manufacturers' warranties;
c) Prohibitions on modifying or tampering with the product
(including disassembly and reverse engineering);
d) Prohibitions on uses of the product that would have been
permitted by the application of the fair-use doctrine in
copyright law;
e) Requirements that the consumer not contest the validity of
the producer's copyright or patent;
f) Requirements that the user pay royalties for a period longer
than would be permitted by copyright or patent law.
Conditions of type (a), we have just concluded, are
presumptively socially beneficial, insofar as they prevent the arbitrage
that interferes with price discrimination. 92 But some of the other
conditions are troubling; they seem more likely to inhibit than to
advance the social vision outlined in Part II.
Perhaps we should disallow terms of the latter sort. This section
explores that possibility in the following stages: section A addresses
the objections that creators are likely to voice against any limitations
on their contractual freedom-and, in so doing, introduces a set of
arguments that can bej harnessed in our analysis of the Internet.
Section B considers various procedural circumstances that might
prompt us to be skeptical of some contractual terms. Section C then
considers substantive reasons for skepticism. Finally, section D takes
up the difficult question of how we might go about limiting the ways
90. See Mark A. Lemley, IntellectualProperty and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
1239 (1995).
91. See id. at 1242-48.
92. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
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in which contracts and technology can be employed.
A. Context
The producers of informational products are likely to raise a hue
and cry at the very suggestion of compulsory terms. "We created this
material," they will say. "We could refuse to let anyone have access
to it. Why shouldn't we be able to set as we wish the terms on which
consumers will be afforded access to it?" More broadly, "why should
we be forced to forego income in order to foster your vision of a just
society; at a minimum, shouldn't such burdens be spread to the
society at large?"93
The first step in meeting this collection of objections is to dispel
the notion that limitations on contractual freedom on the Internet
would be unprecedented or anomalous. Compulsory terms are
ubiquitous in American law. Examples include: implied warranties of
merchantability; implied warranties of habitability in residential
leaseholds; rent control; minimum-wage laws; maximum-hours
legislation; bans on child labor; compulsory terms in insurance
policies; manufacturers' strict liability for injuries caused by their
products; and protections for mortgagors and the occupants of
migrant labor camps. In all of these situations, the parties are not
obliged to enter into contractual relations.
(The owner of a
residential building is not obliged to rent out his apartments; a
lawnmower manufacturer is not obliged to sell lawnmowers; an
employer is not obliged to hire anyone.) But if they choose to enter
into such relations, they must incorporate in their agreements the
terms in question, and courts will refuse to honor even explicit,
bargained-for, and compensated waivers of those terms.
Mandatory limitations on the forms or uses of technology are
equally common. In countless situations, we compel persons who
supply certain commodities to the public to include specified features.
Seatbelts, airbags, catalytic converters, child-proof caps, warning
labels (on cigarettes and drugs), construction features specified by
building codes or the Americans with Disabilities Act, safety features
in electrical appliances-the list is endless. The persons supposedly
benefited by such features sometimes would happily do without them,

93. Cf. WHITE PAPER, supra note 72. "The Working Group rejects the notion that
copyright owners should be taxed-apart from all others-to facilitate the legitimate goal of
'universal access."'
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but we refuse to allow manufacturers to omit them, and we usually
forbid purchasers to disable them.
Why? What sorts of considerations could justify such severe
limitations on the freedom of consenting adults? The rationales fall
into six general categories. They are worth reviewing here-both to
suggest the diversity and strength of the arguments for limits on
contractual freedom in general and to suggest lines of inquiry when
we return our attention to the Internet.
(1) Bad Information. It is often the case that one of the parties
to a contract has inadequate information concerning either
the content of the deal or the likely impact of the deal on his
or her welfare. Under those circumstances, our usual
assumption that voluntary transactions benefit all
signatories no longer holds. 94 Defects in the quality of the
available information can sometimes be corrected by
conditioning the enforceability of a bargain on full
disclosure of all relevant data. So, for example, we require
mortgagors to read and sign documents alerting them to the
magnitude of their commitments before permitting them to
sign their lives away.
But, the mandatory-disclosure
strategy is not always practicable. For example, it is
sometimes said that no amount of disclosure can enable a
prospective surrogate mother to fully appreciate the pain
she may feel when she is later obliged to give up a baby she
has carried to term. On that basis, many courts and
commentators take the position that surrogacy contracts
should be unenforceable-at least against the surrogate
mother.95 A similar argument is sometimes used to justify
the ban (in the United States and in a growing number of
other countries) on sales of kidneys or other nonrenewable
bodily parts.96
(2) Externalities. Left to their own devices, contracting parties
in certain situations would likely enter into agreements that
harmed third parties.
To prevent those injuries, the
contracting parties are either disabled from making certain
94. See, e.g., Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism,84 VA. L. REV. 229 (1998).
95. See, e.g., Margaret Friedlander Brinig, A MaternalisticApproach to Surrogacy, 81 VA.
L. REV. 2377 (1995). But see Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing
Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood,5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH & POL'Y 21 (1989) (disputing that
argument).
96. See National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1994).
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sorts of deals or are obliged to accept specified terms. For
example, bans on insurance contracts that enable the
insured to escape liability for willful misconduct are often
Avoiding "negative psychic
justified on this basis.
externalities" (the emotional injuries sustained by third
parties disturbed by the content of certain kinds of
contracts) similarly is often cited to proscribe morally
offensive deals.
Arguments from Future Selves. We often limit persons'
freedom on the theory that they will thank us tomorrow (or
20 years from now)7 Bans on suicide and requirements that
motorcyclists wear helmets, for example, are rooted
partially in such arguments. Forbidding a young person to
sell his kidney in order to buy a sports car can (and has
been) justified on a similar basis.
Distributive Justice. Compulsory terms are sometimes
justified on the ground that they redistribute wealth from
richer to poorer people. Rent control and nonwaivable
terms in residential leaseholds, for example, are said to
redistribute wealth from (richer) landlords to (poorer)
tenants. 98 Whether they in fact have such an effect remains
a hotly contested issue, but most (not all) participants in that
debate agree that if they did so, they would be defensible.
Public Policy. Certain kinds of contracts are forbidden on
the ground that they are inconsistent with our collective
vision of a decent and just society. Contracts for the sale of
sexual services and child-labor contracts, for example, are
commonly repudiated on this ground.99
Paternalism. Finally and most controversially, compulsory
terms are sometimes forthrightly justified on the ground
that public officials know better than the persons whose
freedom is curtailed what is in those persons' best interest.
In the volatile debate over the legitimacy of the

97. See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763

(1983).

98. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of
Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971);
Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on Low Income Housing:
"Milking" and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 485 (1987); Kronman, supra note 97;
Duncan Kennedy, The Ex Post Distributive Case for "Insurance-Like" Compulsory Terms in
Consumer Contracts(draft of July 23, 1996).
99. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660 (1976).
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nonwaivable implied warranty of habitability, for example,
one often finds arguments of this sort. Tenants may think
that they would be better off paying a lower rent for a
shabbier apartment and using the extra money for
something else, but lawmakers know better.100
To summarize, the limitation of the freedom of the suppliers and
consumers of material on the Internet to use either contracts or
technology to rearrange the entitlements they enjoy under the default
rules of intellectual property would surely not be unusual. And the
arguments that have been deployed in support of analogous
limitations on contractual freedom in other contexts may provide us
with clues concerning how best to deal with this new medium.
B. ProceduralProblems
In recent essays, Julie Cohen and Niva Elkin-Koren argue
persuasively that the kinds of contracts likely to be arranged on the
Internet differ sharply from the ideal of a individuated, negotiated,
fully voluntary bargain. 101 Click-through licenses and copyright
management systems typically place potential consumers in a "take it
or leave it" position. Opportunities for customized arrangements are
virtually nonexistent. Customers commonly do not read the "terms
and conditions" they are agreeing to. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the potential consumers of an intellectual product are
often not in a position, before deciding whether to agree to a
limitation on its use, to predict how valuable the product will be to
them and how burdensome will be the limitation in question. In
short, Internet-related contracts commonly implicate a dangerous
combination of two conditions: the impediments to customization
typical of contracts of adhesion;102 and informational asymmetries
analogous to those that afflict consumer credit contracts and
surrogacy contracts. 03
100. See Duncan Kennedy, Distributiveand PaternalistMotives in Contract and Tort Law,
with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV.
563 (1982).
101. See Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace, supra note 13; Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in
Cyberspace-Rightswithout Laws?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1155 (1998).
102. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1173 (1983).
103. See the text accompanying notes 94-96, supra. It is possible, as several readers of drafts
of this article have suggested, that these informational asymmetries will diminish over time. To
entice consumers, website operators will offer them "previews" of the menu of materials they
might purchase-or "trial" versions of software that expire after a specified period of time.
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Do these conditions suggest that we should disallow all Internetrelated contracts? No. But they go far toward eliminating the
presumption of social desirability usually accorded voluntary
bargains.
Some Internet-related contracts-and equivalent
technological protections-may well benefit both the parties thereto
and society at large. But, the fact that the consumers who submit to
such arrangements have limited information and even more limited
choices significantly increases the likelihood that deals of a particular
sort would be substantively undesirable and, consequently, should be
disallowed. That likelihood is considered in the following section.
C. Substantive Problems
With relative ease, we can identify two overlapping categories of
contractual terms and equivalent technological systems that are
difficult to reconcile with the vision sketched in Part II. The first
consists of restrictions on the authority or ability of consumers to
An example, taken from the
modify informational products.
Lemley's list, would be a prohibition on altering or reverse
engineering a software program for any purpose-including the
facilitation of interoperability.10 Restrictions of this general sort pose
serious threats to several related ideals: self-expression, semiotic
democracy, and cultural diversity. We should look for ways to
encourage, rather than retard, manipulation by consumers of
05
informational products and tools.1
The second type of highly problematic contractual provision
consists of restrictions on uses of informational products traditionally
privileged by the fair-use doctrine-parody, criticism, scholarship,
etc. 106 We have a strong social interest in continuing to permit, indeed
promote, behavior of these various sorts. Many of these activities
necessitate (or are facilitated by) copying significant portions of the
products-which of course would run afoul section 106 of the

Indeed, one can already find many instances of these marketing strategies on the Web. One
worries about the representativeness of some of the trailers. Nevertheless, if this trend
continues, the second of the two procedural objections to on-line contracts will weaken.
104. See the text accompanying note 91, supra.
105. See Netanel, supra note 37, at 378.
106. By "traditionally," I mean activities shielded by the fair-use doctrine-understood as a
device to protect the public interest, not to cure market failures. See Merges, supra note 17, at
130-36 (comparing the two approaches and suggesting that the former should be "revived" for
use on the Internet).

19981

PROPERTY AND CONTRACT ON THE INTERNET

Copyright Act.07 One of the purposes of section 107 has been to
authorize copying in such contexts.108 We do not wish to enable
producers to circumvent section 107 through the use of contracts or
technology.
The arguments offered in the preceding two paragraphs have
been phrased in the language of "public policy" (the fifth of the six
conventional arguments for compulsory terms reviewed in section A).
They might be rephrased in the vocabulary of microeconomics (the
second of the six approaches) as follows: Consumers collectively have
a strong interest in preserving opportunities for transformation,
parody, and criticism of intellectual products. Uses of those sorts
increase the range of products available to consumers as a group.
More importantly, such uses enable consumers to assess more
accurately the quality of each entry on the menu of intellectual
products which they are presented, thereby increasing the chances
that the products they choose will actually please them. The resultant
efficiency gains are large.109 Unfortunately, the interest of each
individual consumer in preserving such opportunities is small.
Moreover, each individual has an incentive to "free ride" on the
willingness of other consumers to insist upon (and pay for) the right
to engage in criticism and parody. These conditions create a serious
danger that consumers, acting individually, will strike deals that, in
the aggregate, hurt them.
To overcome this collective-action
problem, we will compel them all to accept a contractual term that is
really in their best interest.
The foregoing analysis has a good deal of force, but something
crucial has been lost in the translation.11 0 A more honest-albeit
controversial-way of presenting the argument would acknowledge
that it is paternalistic in character (the sixth of the approaches).
Americans would be better off, I have argued, if they lived in a more
culturally diverse and artistically rich society, in which they had
greater opportunities to participate in the shaping of their cultural
environment. Even in the absence of collective-action problems, they
might well be inclined to waive contractual provisions designed to
foster such a society, but we should not let them.

107.
10&
109.
detail).
110.

See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
See id. §107.
See Fisher, Fair Use Doctrine, supra note 5, at 1712 (presenting this point in more
See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987).
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So far, we have addressed only contractual and technological
restrictions on activities that either might be characterized as
"transformative" or would have been privileged by the traditional
forms of the fair-use doctrine. But these by no means exhaust the
kinds of conditions that creators are demanding-or are likely soon to
demand.
Some of those terms seem relatively benign. Indeed, even some
activities that might formerly have fit within a generous interpretation
of the fair-use doctrine do not seem crucial to protect. For example,
it does not seem essential to the social vision set forth in Part II that
producers be forbidden to require consumers to pay when they use
small portions of an informational product. "Microcharges" of this
sort represent one way of fine-tuning the system of price

discrimination-which,

for

the

reasons

presumptively socially advantageous.

outlined

above,

is

As long as producers are

willing to permit (for a fee) such uses, rather than forbid them, it is
hard to see why we should object."'

What about contractual provisions extending beyond the
copyright term the period in which consumers are obliged to pay for

Internet access to works? One's first reaction to such provisions is
111. At a conference at Yale at which this article was discussed, the participants identified
two grounds on which one might find such a regime objectionable. First, Wendy Gordon
contended that a system of microcharges would both enhance the "granularity" of social life and
erode our sense of gratitude for the fact that we daily receive for free the enormous value of the
culture generated by prior generations. "If I had to pay for every tittle thing, that gratitude
might dry up." Second, Larry Lessig pointed to the danger that information producers, in their
efforts to obtain the information necessary to fine-tune their price-discrimination systems,
would seriously invade personal privacy. The nightmare, of course, is a world in which access to
information and entertainment is regulated by a set of digital certificates that enable suppliers
(and other organizations, including the state) to know almost everything about everyone.
The first danger does not seem especially great. Recall the system for distributing daily
newspapers, described in note 84, supra. Would that make people resentful or ungrateful? To
be sure, subscribers would be aware that they had to pay for every slice of information. On the
other hand, their total costs would be significantly lower than at present. And they might well
be grateful for the fact that they did not have to pay anything on mornings when they were
either too busy to read or on vacation. Finally, the "granularity" of the scheme would be hidden
(for better and worse) in the monthly credit-card bill.
The second danger seems more serious. Under this regime, information providers would
indeed have an incentive to ferret out as much information as they could concerning each
potential consumer-her preferences, her income, her health, etc. The appropriate response to
the resultant threat to our privacy would seem to be a separate regulation-in the general spirit
of the recent European initiative-limiting the collection and dissemination of personal
information.
Such a regulation would, of course, prevent information suppliers from
approaching perfect or "first-degree" price discrimination-in which each consumer is charged
exactly what the product is worth to him or her. But that effect would not be altogether bad.
Among other things, it would improve the chances that the partial price discrimination in which
the producers are able to engage would have the effect of increasing, rather than decreasing,
total consumer surplus. See supra note 84.
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probably that they will rarely have any practical bite-insofar as the
commercial life of the vast majority of material likely to be made
available on the Internet will be much shorter than the life of the
author plus fifty years. No great harm, consequently, would result
from permitting them. Nevertheless, such a clause seems somehow
offensive-greedy. Underlying that intuition is a serious general
concern. Intellectual property law, it is often said, deliberately offers
limited rewards to authors and inventors. Our goal is to give creators
enough entitlements to induce them to produce the works from which
we all benefit but no more-thus increasing the likelihood that their
creations will get into the hands of consumers (at prices the
consumers can afford). More precisely, our aspiration, when
designing or reforming the intellectual property system, is to increase
the set of entitlements enjoyed by creators only up to the point past
which the social losses caused by empowering creators to limit access
to their works would exceed the social gains caused by increasing
their collective output of works. We lack the information necessary
to achieve this objective with any precision,112 but the general idea is
clear enough, and has guided the interpretation or reform of a wide
variety of doctrines in the field.
This general observation has important implications for the
management of Internet contracts. For the reasons outlined above,
permitting producers to use such contracts will usually enable them to
make money from their products more effectively than they could
through reliance upon copyright law-an effect that we accept
because of its potential benefits in efficiently fostering an
informational society and rich artistic tradition. But the superiority in
this respect of the contractual strategy reinforces the principle that
producers' income-generating entitlements need not and should not
be unlimited. Our aspiration, when shaping their contractual powers,
should be the same as our aspiration when shaping the entitlements
of copyright owners: to cut off their rights at the point beyond which
social losses would exceed social gains. That point is just as difficult
to identify in this context as it is in the traditional copyright context.
(Perhaps more so, insofar as the social gains and losses we are
comparing are no longer limited by the economic calculus that has
112. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); George L. Priest,
What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual Property: Comment on Cheung, 8
RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 19 (J.

Palmer & R. Zerbe eds., 1986).
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traditionally shaped the copyright inquiry.)
But the general
observation can and should help guide our decisions concerning
which sorts of contractual terms we wish to permit.
Fortified by this discussion, let's return to the question of
provisions that permit producers to charge fees for longer than the
copyright term. Considering the range of entitlements that we have
so far contemplated conferring on producers and the minimal value to
them of income streams longer than their lives plus fifty years, it
seems plausible that we should prohibit the use of such a contractual
provision. But we may wish to go much further-to limit much more
dramatically the payments producers can extract from consumers. In
view of the ephemeral nature of much of the material on the Internet,
limiting (even much more sharply) the permissible duration of
Internet contracts is likely to be a clumsy or ineffective way of
achieving that end.113 Limiting the prices producers could charge
would be more effective, 114 but would have several disadvantages: it
would entail a sacrifice of many of the benefits (including distributive
justice) of partial price discrimination, and it would be
administratively complex and thus costly. A better strategy would be
to privilege the kinds of activities we consider especially socially
valuable-i.e., forbid producers from charging anything to consumers
who put their products to those ends.-1
A comprehensive list of such activities would be impossible,
given the rapidity with which the Net is evolving, but here are some
suggestive possibilities:
*
Educational Uses.
Creators should be obliged (as a
condition of being permitted to charge other kinds of
consumers) to provide students and faculty in schools of all
levels free access to their creations.
*
Political Uses. Creators should be similarly obliged to
permit consumers to copy their products for the purpose of
stimulating or substantiating political debate.116
113. For this reason, I do not support this aspect of Neil Netanel's interesting package of
reform proposals. See Netanel, supra note 37, at 369.
114. Analogous regimes would include compulsory licensing systems, which are reasonably
common in copyright law, and rent control.
115. Cf. Merges, supra note 17, at 134-35 (suggesting a similar strategy).
116. Yochai Benkler has identified a real case involving the kind of copying that would be
privileged by this compulsory term:
[A] website... called the Free Republic... includes a forum where conservatives
share news clippings and exchange opinions on line. Users who read articles they
think deserve comment cut and paste them onto the forum. They then post a
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*

Browsing in Public Libraries. Public libraries have
traditionally functioned in the United States as important
educational institutions and vehicles of distributive justice,
providing free access to informational products to persons
unable to purchase it. Those roles should-and could-be
preserved in the new medium, by permitting visitors to
libraries to browse (for free) materials for which, on their
home or office computers, they would have to pay.
*
Scientific or Medical Research. Ensuring that researchers
were not priced out of the markets for intellectual products
117
would be especially important in the cases of databases.
In exchange for allowing the developers of such databases to
charge for access to them (i.e., for not declaring such
arrangements preempted by the Copyright Act), we might
insist that they afford free access to all researchers who can
show that they will not profit thereby.
In all of these instances, it would be appropriate to allow creators
to bury in their products devices that prevented serial copying, thus
reducing the risk that the material, once made available without
charge to privileged users, would become available for free to all
users.
Note that the effect of shielding activities of these sorts would be
a pattern of entitlements sharply different from those commended by
recent commentators on the fair-use doctrine. Tom Bell, for example,
expects and hopes that copyright management technology, by making
it easy to charge consumers for access to small portions of
copyrighted works, will reduce the set of activities excused as "fair"
under section 107.118 My argument, rather, is that the new technology,
combined with a tolerant posture toward price discrimination, will
permit creators to enhance their revenues substantially. Those
increased profits would then be (partially or wholly) offset by a

comment, and other users participate in a threaded discussion of the article. In
October 1998 the Washington Post and the L.A. Times decided that public discourse
may well be a good thing, but not when someone else uses their stories to evoke it. So
they brought a copyright action to prevent the users of Free Republic from posting the
newspapers' stories to their political forum.
Yochai Benkler, The Free Republic Problem: Markets in Information Goods vs. The
Marketplace of Ideas (visited June 4, 1999) <http://webserver.law.yale.edu/censor/benkler.htm>
(footnotes omitted).
117. See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyright in Cyberspace: Don't Throw Out the
Public Interest With the Bath Water, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 403, 405 (1995).
118. See Bell, supra note 44.
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dramatic expansion of the set of activities privileged under the fairuse doctrine. 119 The net result: creators will be no worse off, and
society at large-in the senses described above-will be much better
off.
D. Mechanics
How should compulsory terms of these sorts be established and
enforced? The difficulty of answering this question is perhaps the

most serious threat to the proposal advanced in this paper. Two
circumstances afflict all efforts to implement a scheme of the sort
sketched above. First, while the Internet is "worldwide" in its scope
and operation, both contract and intellectual property law are, for the
time being, formulated and enforced either by individual nations or

by separate states within nations.

International institutions-most

importantly, the World Intellectual Property Organization-are
helping to mitigate the balkanization of Internet law, but we are still a
long way short of a fully international law of the Internet.120 Second,

the protean character of the Internet strongly suggests that the
boundary between legitimate and illegitimate contracts and uses of
119. An interesting problem identified by Ed Baker and Matthew Funk: Might not the types
of creators benefited by the ability to engage in price discrimination be different from the types
harmed by the expanded set of compulsory terms? If so, would not the proposed scheme cause
a substantial reallocation of resources among various types of informational and entertainment
goods? For example, less investment might go toward textbooks (because of their exposure to
the educational privilege) while more investment were devoted to popular music. The business
of making mainstream movies might become even more lucrative, while making a profit on
cutting-edge films became even harder.
Perhaps. The complex economics of each of these industries make predictions difficult.
But assume that such realignments occurred. Should we be disturbed? Probably-although it is
not obvious that the allocation of resources effected by the current regime (under which, for
example, Hollywood producers and software designers become wealthy, while painters and
performance artists suffer) is demonstrably better than the allocation that would be produced
by the proposed regime. A more serious answer is that, to offset distortions of this sort,
different industries might be subjected to different sets of compulsory terms-producing a
variegated contract law that the Legal Realists would have found congenial.
120. Some hope for the eventual emergence of an international governance system can be
found in the recent emergence of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
("ICANN") and, more specifically, in the dispute-resolution responsibilities that the World
Intellectual Property Organization has proposed that ICANN assume. See The Management of
Internet Names and Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues, Interim Report of the WIPO Internet
Domain Name Process (Dec. 23, 1998) <http://wipo2.wipo.int/process/eng/rfc3/interim2.html>.
There are many serious flaws in the WIPO proposal, see A. Michael Froomkin, Major Flaws in
the WIPO Domain Name Proposal-A Quick Guide (visited June 4, 1999) <http://
www.law.miami.edu/-amf/quickguide.htm>.
Nevertheless, the proposal has one important
virtue: It may begin the process of constructing a system of law capable of governing the
genuinely global phenomenon of the Internet. For a general discussion of the issues raised by
ICANN, see Domain Names, supra note 45.

1998]

PROPERTYAND CONTRACT ON THE INTERNET

technology

should be

regularly

readjusted.

The

lawmaking

institutions that might adopt the sorts of norms advocated above lack
the necessary sensitivity and flexibility. In short, full implementation
of the thesis of this paper most likely must await institutional reform.
With that major qualification, however, it is possible to identify a
few ways in which at least a crude system of compulsory terms might
be established. Each of these options is imperfect, but pursuing these
avenues would be better than doing nothing.
Here are the

possibilities:
(1) State courts could define a regime of compulsory terms
through the administration of ordinary contract law-just as they
have done when defining implied warranties of merchantability.121
The doctrinal hooks on which such results could be hung are the
familiar ones: unconscionability and the nonenforceability of

contractual terms that violate public policy. Pursuit of this option
would require rejection of the Internet Protection Act proposed by
Representative White, which would prohibit states or municipalities
from regulating rates, charges, practices, classification, facilities, or
services on the Net.122

(2) The ALI could provide the states guidance on this question
by adopting a more refined version of the proposed UCC section
2B.123 Instead of validating virtually all "click through" licenses, the
provision might authorize enforcement only of license agreements

consistent with the guidelines identified in this paper. 124 Or perhaps
(taking a cue from Karl Llewellyn, the original draftsman of the

code), it might confer upon judges some discretion to select and
121. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964).
122. See Internet Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 2372,105th Cong., § 2.
123. For the current draft of the provision and for information concerning its status, see The
2BGuide: A Guide to the Proposed Law on Software Transactions: Draft UCC Article 2BSoftware Contracts and Licenses of Information (visited June 4, 1999) <http://
www.2bguide.com/index.html>. For extensive discussion of the merits and demerits of an
earlier (but not substantially different) draft, see Intellectual Property and Contract Law in the
Information Age: The Impact of Article 2B of the UCC on the Future of Transactions in
Information & Electronic Commerce (visited June 4, 1999) <http://sims.berkeley.edu/BCLT/
events/ucc2b/wrap-up.html>.
124. The provision of the current draft that seems most hospitable to the argument
advanced in this article is 2B-105(b), which provides:
If a term of a contract violates a fundamental public policy, the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
impermissible term, or it may so limit the application of any impermissible term as to
avoid any result contrary to public policy, in each case, to the extent that the interest in
enforcement is clearly outweighed by a public policy against enforcement of that term.
U.C.C. 2B-105(b) (Feb. 1, 1999 draft), available in <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2b/
2b299.htm>.
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enforce a changing set of compulsory terms to adapt to the rapidly
changing technology of the Internet.125
(3) The federal courts could declare all contracts inconsistent
with the guidelines outlined in this paper to be preempted by the
federal Copyright Act.126 Justifying such a result under the auspices of
current copyright preemption doctrine would be no easy feat. But
this strategy would have the important advantage of establishing-at
least within the United States-a uniform system of rules governing
permissible contracts.
(4) The federal courts could develop a doctrine of "copyright
misuse"-analogizing from the well-established doctrine of patent
misuse-and then tune it so as to forbid certain efforts to "leverage"
intellectual property rights into other concessions.127
(5) The Librarian of Congress could exercise his or her
authority, under the newly enacted anti-circumvention provisions of
the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, to permit users of particular
types of copyrighted works to employ encryption-defeating
technology-on the ground that, without such permission, those users
would be "likely to be... adversely affected.., in their ability to
make noninfringing uses of that particular class of works."128
(6) Congress could go further and forbid the use of technologies
inconsistent with the guidelines proposed in this article-as it has
forbidden the use of other sorts of encryption.
A final, practical objection to implementation of the system
advocated by this paper merits brief mention. Price discrimination in
the selling of digital products on the Internet may well be desirable
from an economic and social standpoint, but would it not violate the
antitrust laws? Specifically, does it not run afoul the Robinson-

125. For a discussion of the extent to which, and reasons why, Llewellyn wished to confer
discretion on judges, see Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudenceof the Uniform
Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621 (1975).
126. Several commentators have already proposed that preemption doctrine be used to
prevent enforcement either of all Internet-related contracts or some subset thereof. See, e.g.,
Netanel, supra note 37, at 385; Lemley, supra note 90, at 1273-74; David A. Rice, Public Goods,
Private Contractand Public Policy: Federal Preemptionof Software License ProhibitionsAgainst
Reverse Engineering,53 U. PITT.L. REv. 543 (1992).
127. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW & POLICY (2d ed. 1997), Ch. 11;
Merges, supra note 17, section II.C.2.
128. 17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(1)(B). The text of the statute is currently available at (visited June
4, 1999) <http://www.hrrc.org/2281enrolled.pdf>. Among the disadvantages of this strategy is
the fact that, at best, it could carve out a safe haven for consumers no larger than the safe haven
currently provided by the fair-use doctrine. For other disadvantages, see Cohen, Copyright
Management Systems, supra note 13, at 175-78.
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Patman Act, which forbids price discrimination? The answer is:
perhaps, but probably not.129 Three circumstances suggest that the
Robinson-Patman Act would not be construed by federal courts
today to outlaw the kinds of behavior commended here. First, the
statute proscribes price discrimination in sales but not leases-and
most of the transactions discussed in this paper would be (or could
be) characterized as license agreements, not "sales." Second, the
statute applies only to sales of "physical commodities," not to
"intangibles." On that basis, it has been construed not to apply to
sales of advertising. Again, most of the transactions discussed in this
paper would likely slip through the statutory net. Finally, in recent
years antitrust scholars have been nearly unanimous in their
denunciation of the Robinson-Patman Act as economically
senseless-and the courts seem to have responded to that chorus of
criticism by limiting, whenever possible, the reach of the statute.
Consequently, to the extent the foregoing interpretive questions were
not clear-cut, the federal courts would likely resolve them in favor of
allowing the challenged behavior to continue.
CONCLUSION

Many details of the legal regime proposed in this paper remain to
be worked out, but the main features should be clear enough: a
modest set of default entitlements established by a clipped version of
copyright law; considerable authority accorded creators to employ
contracts and technological protections to modify the entitlements
arising from those default rules; and a substantial set of compulsory
terms establishing the limits of that authority.
What would an Internet shaped by such a regime look like? For
the reasons suggested at the outset of the paper, we cannot be sure.
The relevant technology is changing rapidly, as are strategies of the
artists, educators, and businesspersons who are trying to take
advantage of the medium.130 But my best guess is that the resultant
Net would be a smorgasbord of digital materials. Much of the stuff
would continue to be available for free. Much would be draped with
advertising. And, much would be encrypted and thus available only
for a fee-although the fees would likely vary with the amount of
material the user wished to obtain, and perhaps also with the status or
129. See Meurer, supra note 80, at 871 (reaching a similar conclusion).
130. See O'Rourke, supra note 64.
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income of the user. Of the encrypted material, much would be
available without charge to libraries and students. Finally, users of
the Net would have access to a stimulating, irritating, enlivening, and
offensive array of parodies, critiques, and taunts.
By my lights, this image is attractive, and we should adopt the
legal reforms that would help make it a reality.

